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OVERVIEW OF THE TERM;
THE COURT'S COUNTERREVOLUTION COMES IN FITS AND STARTS
By LINDA GREENHOUSE
Copyright 1993 The New York Times Company
The New York Times
July 4, 1993, Sunday, Late Edition - Final
AMONG the flood of opinions that ended the
Supreme Court's term last week, two in particular
underscored the complex and contradictory
personality of a Court poised on the threshold of
change.
On the one hand, the Court strode with surprising
unanimity across a new constitutional frontier in a
case about Government seizure of assets, announcing
a new constitutional right grounded in the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines.
Having only once before even examined the excessive
fines clause, the Court turned it into a potentially
powerful brake on the Government's aggressive use
of its authority under the drug forfeiture laws.
Simultaneously, a decision in a voting rights case
plowed familiar and painful ground for the Court,
revealing the persistence of deep divisions over how
to interpret the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection in the context of racial distinctions made
for assertedly benign reasons. Five Justices said the
Court's precedents made presumptively
unconstitutional any oddly shaped legislative district
drawn for the sole purpose of increasing minority
representation, while the four others drew the
opposite conclusion from the same precedents.
Often united -- the Court was unanimous, in result
if not always in the rationale, in nearly half its cases
this term, far more than in recent years - the Court
nonetheless remains sharply divided in such important
areas as religion and civil rights.
Often tentative and incremental in its approach, the
Court took some unexpectedly decisive steps this
term, as in Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist's
opinion upholding state laws that provide longer
sentences for crimes motivated by bias. The decision
was unanimous.
Rulings in two civil rights cases, the voting rights
case and a decision making a category of cases under
the Federal law against employment discrimination
harder for employees to win, showed dramatically the
impact of the Justices named to the Court by Ronald
Reagan and George Bush.
Four of those Justices - Sandra Day O'Connor,
Anthony M. Kennedy, Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas - joined Chief Justice Rehnquist to provide
5-to-4 majorities in the two cases, which would
almost certainly have been decided differently only a
few years ago. Justice Thomas's votes were
particularly notable because there is no doubt that
Justice Thurgood Marshall, whom Justice Thomas
succeeded in 1991, would have been on the other
side.
But another decision demonstrated the limits of the
Court's counterrevolution. The Court ruled that the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment can make it unconstitutional to
confine a nonsmoking prisoner in a cell with a
chain-smoker. The decision rejected the Bush
Administration's view that this "novel Eighth
Amendment claim" was "without merit."
Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion that took
issue with 17 years of Supreme Court precedents on
unconstitutional prison conditions, arguing that all
were based on a broad view of the Eighth
Amendment at variance with the framers' original
intent. Only Justice Scalia joined the dissent. The
vote in the case was 7 to 2.
As Justice Thomas maintained a predictable
alliance with Justice Scalia - the two voted together
in more than 80 percent of the non-unanimous cases
- Justice David H. Souter emerged this term as
perhaps the Court's least predictable member.
Justice Souter, who like Justice Thomas was named
to the Court by President Bush, dissented in the two
civil rights cases as well as in a series of
criminal-law rulings in which the conservative
majority prevailed. Notable among these was a
decision refusing to permit a Texas death-row inmate,
Leonel Herrera, to bring a belated claim of innocence
into Federal court through a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. The vote was 6 to 3, with Justice
Souter joining Justices Harry A. Blackmun and John
Paul Stevens in dissent.
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Justice Souter also dissented from a 5-to-4 decision
in a double jeopardy case, in which the majority
overturned a three-year-old precedent that had
broadened the double jeopardy defense. His allies in
dissent were Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Byron
R. White. And in a church-state case, he dissented
from the Chief Justice's 5-to-4 opinion that found no
constitutional objection to the government paying for
a sign-language interpreter for a deaf parochial school
student.
These developments do not necessarily mean that
the conservative New Hampshire judge suddenly
emerged this year as a liberal; "liberal" has been a
highly relative term at the Supreme Court since the
retirements of Justice Marshall and Justice William J.
Brennan Jr., whom Justice Souter succeeded in 1990.
Rather, Justice Souter's hallmark is a willingness
to confront some of the Court's murkiest doctrinal
areas, working his way through the contradictions to
try at the same time both to make sense of the
precedents that apply and to steer clear of those that
do not. Through this process, he appears this term to
have found a personal voice almost completely free
of ideological identity.
For example, in his dissenting opinion in the voting
rights case, Justice Souter identified the flaw in
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion as a confusion of
categories. The majority drew on precedents in the
affirmative action and public contracting area; in light
of those precedents, it was not hard to deem the
bizarre-looking North Carolina Congressional District
an unjustifiable racial preference.
Without commenting directly on the affirmative
action cases - on which he may well agree with the
conservative majority - Justice Souter said the
analogy was inapt. Unlike the workplace, where ajob
or contract for one person may leave someone else
empty-handed, redistricting does not confer a
zero-sum benefit, he said. Everyone can still vote, no
matter where the district lines are; the Constitution is
offended only by some further action such as an
effort to use district lines to dilute a racial group's
political power.
Justice Souter's independence made him a frequent
dissenter. He dissented in 12 of the 17 cases that
were decided by 5-to-4 votes. In 40 cases in which
Justice Scalia and Justice Blackmun were on opposite
sides, he voted with Justice Scalia in 56 percent and
with Justice Blackmun in 44 percent.
The least frequent dissenter was Justice Kennedy,
who dissented in only four of the 5-to-4 decision and
in five out of 107 decisions over all. The term found
Justice Kennedy anchored in the Court's mainstream.
For example, he dissented only twice in 30 criminal
law decisions.
Presumably the center of gravity will shift with
Justice White's retirement and the all but certain
confirmation of Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg as the
first Supreme Court nominee by a Democratic
President in 26 years. How great the shift will be is
not yet clear; Justice White was in dissent in the civil
rights decisions, for example, so his departure does
not open those rulings to challenge even assuming
Judge Ginsburg shares his displeasure. In other areas
in which the Court is often closely divided, including
free speech, religion and abortion, Judge Ginsburg is
likely to be substantially more liberal than Justice
White.
With characteristic wryness, Justice White ended
his 31-year Supreme Court career on Monday by
expressing the hope that the Court's future opinions
would be "clear, crisp" and easy for lower court
judges to understand and apply. Whatever new
departures are now in store for the Court, fulfilling
Justice White's wish is not likely to be one of them.
Following are summaries of some of the Court's
major rulings of the term, which began Oct. 5 and
ended June 28.
Criminal Law Restrictions on Seizing A Suspect's
Property And on Death Penalty Appeals
For the first time, the Court set a constitutional
limit on the Government's power to seize the homes,
businesses and other property of criminals and
suspects, invoking the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against "excessive fines" clause to hold
that a forfeiture can be excessive.
The 9-to-0 ruling in Austin v. U.S., No. 92-6073,
left to the lower courts the application of that general
principle to specific cases. In this case, a North
Dakota man lost his business and mobile home after
selling two grams of cocaine to an undercover agent.
An earlier forfeiture case this term, involving a
statute rather than the Constitution, had indicated the
Court's growing skepticism toward the Government's
aggressive use of forfeiture as a tool in the war on
drugs. The Court interpreted a Federal drug
forfeiture law to provide an exception for "innocent
owners" that was considerably broader than the
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Government's view of that defense. The 6-to-3 vote
in U.S. v. A Parcel of Land, No. 91-781, permitted
a woman to defend her house against forfeiture on the
ground that she did not know the money used to buy
the house came from her boyfriend's drug dealing.
In the second Eighth Amendment case, the Court
ruled by a vote of 7 to 2 that it may be cruel and
unusual punishment to confine a nonsmoking prisoner
in a cell with a chain-smoking cellmate. The Eighth
Amendment applies to future as well as current harm
to prisoners, the Court ruled in Helling v. McKinney,
No. 91-1958.
Prisoners fared less well outside the Eighth
Amendment area; the Court continued to take a
restrictive view of the right of state inmates to seek
Federal court review of their convictions or sentences
through petitions for writs of habeas corpus. In a
Texas death penalty case, the Court ruled 6 to 3 that
a belated claim of innocence does not ordinarily
entitle a death-row inmate to a new Federal court
hearing before being executed.
The inmate, Leonel Herrera, had tried to reopen
his case with new evidence 10 years after his
conviction for murder. The Supreme Court rejected
his argument that the 30-day limit for seeking a new
trial under Texas law is unconstitutional. He was
executed several months after the Court's ruling in
Herrera v. Collins, No. 91-7328. Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote the opinion, with Justices Blackmun,
Stevens and Souter dissenting.
In another significant habeas corpus defeat for
prisoners, the Court ruled 5 to 4 that Federal courts
may not overturn a state conviction on the basis of
constitutional error unless the prisoner can show that
he suffered "actual prejudice" from the error. The
decision, Brecht v. Abrahamson, No. 91-7358, had
the effect of shifting the burden of proof from the
state to the prisoner, because the state previously had
the burden of proving that any constitutional error
was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote the decision, with Justices
White, O'Connor, Souter and Blackmun dissenting.
The one habeas corpus decision that was a victory
for prisoners did not actually change the law, but
rather preserved the status quo. Voting 5 to 4, the
Court refused to close off Federal court access for
prisoners seeking to challenge their convictions on the
ground that they had been interrogated by the police
without first receiving their Miranda warning of the
right to remain silent.
Justice Souter's majority opinion rejected the view,
pressed by the Bush Administration, that prisoners
who had already received one "full and fair
opportunity" to make a Miranda argument in a
state-court appeal should not be able to reargue the
question in Federal court. Chief Justice Rehnquist
along with Justice Scalia, O'Connor and Thomas
dissented in Withrow v. Williams, No. 91-1030.
Overturning a three-year-old precedent that had
broadened the definition of double jeopardy, the
Court ruled 5 to 4 that a man could be prosecuted for
trying to kill his wife after having already been held
in criminal contempt for violating a court order not
to assault her. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion in
U.S. v. Dixon, No. 91-1231, with Justices Souter,
White, Stevens and Blackmun dissenting.
The Court ruled unanimously that the police do not
need a warrant to seize narcotics that were
recognizable by "plain feel" while frisking a suspect
for concealed weapons. The decision, Minnesota v.
Dickerson, No. 91-2019, created a tactile analogue to
the "plain view" doctrine, under which police do not
need a warrant to seize clearly visible items.
The Court ruled unanimously that regardless of the
evidence, a criminal conviction is invalid if the judge
did not instruct the jury properly on finding guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a mistake can never
be "harmless error," the Court said in Sullivan v.
Louisiana, No. 92-5129.
Civil Rights New Hurdles for Black Majority
Districts And Job Bias Suits
With two 5-to-4 decisions, one interpreting the
Constitution and the other the Federal law against
employment discrimination, the Court forcefully
re-entered the civil rights debate.
The Court ruled that legislative districts drawn in
"bizarre" shapes and designed to increased black
representation can violate the constitutional rights of
white voters to equal protection of the law.
The district in question was the 12th Congressional
District of North Carolina, a narrow 160-mile long
ribbon running through 10 counties along Interstate
85. In her majority opinion in Shaw v. Reno, No.
92-357, Justice O'Connor said the district "resembles
the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past"
and that the state must demonstrate a "compelling
interest" for having drawn it in disregard of
traditional redistricting criteria favoring compact and
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contiguous districts.
While the decision cast doubt on the fate of a
number of new black-majority districts, its full impact
is unclear because the Court did not distinguish a
"bizarre" district from the merely unusual.
In the employment discrimination case, the Court
placed a new legal burden on workers who show that
an employer gave a dishonest courtroom explanation
for an apparently discriminatory action. In the view
of most courts, at that point the worker was entitled
to a favorable judgment, even if there was no direct
evidence of discrimination.
But the Court ruled in St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks, No. 92-602, that the worker may still be
required to present direct evidence of the employer's
discriminatory intent or to refute theoretical
explanations other than the one the employer offered.
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion.
In both cases, the dissenters were the same:
Justices White, Stevens, Blackmun and Souter.
Free Speech A Hate-Crime Statute With Increased
Sentences Is Finally Upheld
The most important free-speech question of the
term was the validity of state hate-crime laws that
provide increased sentences for violent crimes
motivated by bias. The Court unanimously upheld a
Wisconsin law that is similar to those on the books in
half the states. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, No. 92-515, said that the law
was aimed at "conduct unprotected by the First
Amendment" rather than the defendant's thoughts or
expression.
In a significant ruling on commercial speech, the
Court reaffirmed its view that advertising is protected
by the First Amendment and held that a city could
not automatically bar advertising brochures from
newspaper vending machines on public property.
Justice Stevens wrote the 6-to-3 opinion in Cincinnati
v. Discovery Network, No. 91-1200; the dissenters
were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
Thomas.
In a case raising a question under the Freedom of
Information Act rather than the Constitution, the
Court unanimously rejected the Justice Department's
sweeping assertion that all sources supplying
information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in
a criminal investigation should be treated as
"confidential" and exempt from disclosure. (U.S. v.
Landano, No. 91-2054).
Abortion Two Laws Banned, One Stays And
Operation Rescue Triumphs Over Federal Judges
The Court displayed no interest in revisiting or
elaborating on its 1992 ruling in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey that reaffirmed a constitutional right to
abortion. The Justices refused to hear appeals from
Louisiana and the territory of Guam, where laws
banning most abortion had been declared
unconstitutional by lower Federal courts. At the same
time, the Court refused to hear a challenge by
abortion-rights advocates to a Mississippi law with a
24-hour waiting period, similar to Pennsylvania's
waiting period that the Justices upheld in the Casey
decision.
By a 6-to-3 vote, the Court removed a tool that
judges around the country had used to protect
abortion clinics against disruptive protests by
Operation Rescue and other anti-abortion groups. The
Court ruled in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic, No. 90-985, that a Reconstruction-era civil
rights law enacted to protect blacks from the Ku Klux
Klan did not give Federal judges jurisdiction to issue
injunctions against the blockades and mass protests.
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion, from which
Justices Stevens, O'Connor and Blackmun dissented.
In its next term, the Court will decide whether
abortion clinics can sue the organizers of the
demonstrations under the Federal racketeering law.
Government The U.S. May Intercept Fleeing Haitians
at Sea And Deny Them Asylum
The Court upheld the Senate's shortcut procedure
for conducting impeachment trials of Federal judges,
ruling 9 to 0 that the Senate's choice of how to
discharge its constitutional duty to "try all
impeachments" is not subject to judicial review.
The decision, Nixon v. U.S., No. 91-740,
effectively upheld the recent removal of two
impeached Federal judges, Walter L. Nixon and
Alcee L. Hastings, who is now a Congressman from
Florida. For their trials, a special committee of 12
Senators heard witnesses and compiled evidence,
tasks that the judges argued had to be done by the
Senate as a whole and could not be delegated.
The Court upheld the Bush and Clinton
Administrations' policy of intercepting fleeing
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Haitians at sea and returning them to Haiti without
asylum hearings. The 8-to-1 decision, written by
Justice Stevens with Justice Blackmun dissenting,
rejected arguments that the policy violated Federal
immigration law and an international treaty on
refugees. (Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, No.
92-344).
Courts When Science Experts Knock, Judges Will Be
The Gatekeepers
In its first ruling on the place of scientific
evidence in Federal courtrooms, the Court placed
judges firmly in charge of keeping bad science out
and letting good science in. The 7-to-2 decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow, No. 92-102, held that while
an expert witness's actual conclusions need not be
"generally accepted" in the scientific community, the
"methods and procedures" used in reaching those
results must be valid. The judge should limit the
jury's consideration to testimony or evidence that is
"not only relevant, but reliable," Justice Blackmun
said for the Court.
The Court had been widely expected to set a new
constitutional limit on punitive damages this term.
But it declined to do so, instead upholding a
$10-million punitive damage award for a $19,000
injury, in a 6-to-3 decision that made little new law.
The Court found that the award, while "certainly
large," bore enough relationship to the economic
stakes involved in the commercial dispute over rights
to a West Virginia oil field as not to violate the
losing side's right to due process of law. (TXO
Production v. Alliance Resources, No. 92-479).
Religion The Standoff Between Church and State
Eases at School
Despite three church-state cases on its docket, the
Court made little new law in this area. It ruled 9 to
0 that a Hialeah, Fla. ordinance banning ritual animal
sacrifice violated the free-exercise rights of adherents
of the Santeria religion, in which animal sacrifice has
a central role. The Court found that the ordinance,
which was drafted to allow such practices as
recreational hunting and kosher slaughter to continue,
had the unconstitutional purpose of suppressing
religious observance. (Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye v. City of Hialeah, No. 91-948)
In another 9-to-0 decision, the Court ruled that
public school systems that open their schools to
after-hours use by community groups must permit
religious groups to use the buildings on the same
terms. The Court held in Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches School District, No. 91-2024, that a
religious viewpoint could not constitutionally be
excluded from a public forum open to other
viewpoints.
The Court ruled 5 to 4 that the Constitution
permits using government money to pay for a
sign-language interpreter to accompany a deaf child
to a parochial school. The child would have been
entitled to the interpreter in public school under a
Federal law that requires appropriate services for
handicapped schoolchildren. The question in Zobrest
v. Catalina School District, No. 92-94, was whether
providing the service in a parochial school amounted
to an unconstitutional establishment of religion.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion said that
the interpreter was a permissible service aimed at
helping the child and not the school. Justices
Blackmun, Souter, O'Connor and Stevens dissented.
Taxes, Business Moonlighters' Alert: Deductions for
Home Offices Take a Hit
The Court made it harder than ever for taxpayers
to take deductions for the spare rooms they use at
home to handle the administrative aspects their
businesses.
By an 8-to-1 vote, the Court backed the Internal
Revenue Service's view that the question is not
whether a home office is legitimate or even
necessary, but whether it is the place where the
taxpayer's most important professional activities take
place. The decision, Commissioner v. Soliman, No.
91-998, refused a deduction claimed by an
anesthesiologist who used his home as his only office,
while practicing his profession in hospital operating
rooms.
The Court redefined its rules on retroactivity,
making a four-year-old tax ruling retroactive in a
decision that may require 16 states to pay huge
refunds to retired Federal workers who did not get a
tax break that the states made available to their own
retired workers. The Court had ruled in 1989 that the
disparity violated a Federal law barring state tax
discrimination against Federal employees. As much
as $2 billion is at stake in the 7-to-2 decision, Harper
v. Virginia, No. 91-794.
The Court ruled that accountants, lawyers and
other outside advisers to corrupt companies cannot be
sued under the Federal racketeering law unless they
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actually participated in the operation or management
of the client organization. The 7-to-2 ruling, Reves v.
Ernst & Young, No. 91-886, shields outside
professionals, whose deep pockets make them
attractive targets for shareholder lawsuits in securities
cases, from the threat of triple damages liability.
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JUDGING THE JUSTICES... APPRIZING A CRITIC;
MUDDLED ANNALS
By BRUCE FEIN
Copyright 1993 News World Communications, Inc.
The Washington Times
July 8, 1993, Thursday, Final Edition
The 1992-93 Term of the Supreme Court
corroborated the suspicion a year ago that a troika of
Justices - Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy,
and David Souter - are an insurmountable block to a
conservative counterrevolution in constitutional and
statutory doctrines. The suspicion arose when the
trio tipped the court against voluntary prayer in
voluntary graduation ceremonies, Lee vs. Weisman
(1992), and against overruling the Roe vs. Wade
(1973) abortion decree, Planned Parenthood vs.
Casey (1992).
During the 1992-93 term, the three anchored the
court in muddled, narrow, and philosophically
aimless rulings that frequently generated more legal
confusion than was dispelled. No significant change
in constitutional or statutory doctrines was
pronounced. Decisions generally worked at the
margins of precedent, and pleased political
conservatives modestly more than political liberals.
Justice Souter turned markedly more liberal in a
score of telling cases, although the transformation
was neither as acute nor as pernicious as the Dr.
Jekyl and Mr. Hyde phenomenon of Robert Louis
Stevenson fame. For instance, Justice Souter
staunchly defended the Warren Court's Miranda vs.
Arizona (1966) decision that stifles noncoercive
police interrogation of suspects, in Withrow vs.
Williams (1993). And Souter remonstrated in Zobrest
vs. Catalina Foothills School District (1993) against
the public provision of a sign-language interpreter to
assist a deaf child attending a Catholic high school as
part of a religiously neutral program to aid all
handicapped students.
Justice Souter's appointment has proven an
egregious blunder by former President Bush and the
putative constitutional wizards responsible for the
justice's supersonic nomination: John Sununu,
Boyden Gray and Warren Rudman. In a few more
years, Justice Souter might become a virtual echo of
liberal Justice Harry Blackmun, who similarly
commenced his Supreme Court tenure as a moderate
conservative.
Justice Kennedy voted distinctly more
conservatively this term, after flinching last year at a
dramatic overhaul of church-state and abortion
jurisprudence. Justice O'Connor's voting fell
midway between Justice Kennedy and Souter.
Justice Byron White, who is destined for imminent
replacement by Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
characteristically displayed philosophically erratic
voting behavior. He dissented from the court's 5-4
rulings in Shaw vs. Reno (1993) and St. Mary's
Honor Center vs. Hicks (1993) that inveighed
against racial gerrymandering and relaxing a
plaintiff's ordinary burden of persuasion in racial
discrimination cases. Further, he joined Justice
Souter's defense of Miranda in Williams, although he
dissented in 1966 from the original ruling. And
Justice White urged a sweeping interpretation of the
constitutional prohibition against successive
prosecutions for the same offense in United States vs.
Dixon (1993).
Justice White, however, unfolded conservative
credentials in voting to deny application of federal
civil rights laws to abortion demonstrations, Bray vs.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic (1993), and to
sustain use of public sign-language interpreters in
parochial schools in Zobrest. In Johnson vs. Texas
(1993), Justice White exhibited criminal justice
toughness in voting to deny an attack on Texas death
penalty procedures based on alleged deficiencies in
treating youth as a mitigating circumstance. Justice
White also was unsympathetic to the argument in
Herrera vs. Collins (1993) that death row inmates
are automatically entitled to new judicial scrutiny of
their guilt whenever they belatedly advance evidence
of innocence, no matter how flimsy.
During the sunset terms of his Supreme Court
tenure, Justice White fraternized more regularly with
conservative than with liberal justices. Judge
Ginsburg is likely to begin her term in a marginally
more centrist posture. Her initial views may be more
liberal than Justice White's on free speech and
abortion issues, but more conservative on racial,
ethnic and gender preferences.
Lacking strong philosophical convictions, Judge
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Ginsburg could replicate Justice Souter's liberal
transformation, or follow Justice White's hesitant
gravitation toward the conservative justices on the
high court: Chief Justice William Rehnquist and
Associate Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas. A third and most probable possibility is
occupancy of a permanent centrist position a la
former Justice Lewis Powell.
In the notable cases during the 1992-1993 term,
liberals could draw solace in at least a quintet of
rulings. In Church of Lukumi Babalu Inc. vs. City
of Hialeah (1993), the court upheld the claim of
Santeria adherents that an ordinance prohibiting ritual
animal slaughter selectively targeted at their church
violated constitutionally protected religious freedom.
Further, in a concurring opinion, Justice Souter
invited a challenge to the Employment Division,
Department of Human resources vs. Smith (1990)
precedent. There Justice Scalia held for a
five-member majority that evenhandedly applied laws
with a secular purpose pass constitutional muster
irrespective of their fortuitous impact on the practice
of a particular religious creed. Although unnecessary
to deciding Lukumi Babalu, Justice Souter delivered
a 20-page tirade against Smith, and exhorted
would-be litigants to ask for its overruling.
In Williams, the court left the Miranda precedent
in full blossom, and in Austin vs. United States
(1993), it held that the excessive fines clause of the
Eighth Amendment limits government forfeiture
powers. In addition, the Court in Hel-ling vs.
McKinney (1973) concluded that the cruel and
unusual punishment provision of the Eighth
Amendment may prohibit inmate exposure to
environmental tobacco smoke. And in TXO
Production Corp. vs. Alliance Resources (1993), the
court renounced any meaningful constitutional ceiling
on punitive damage awards.
In decisions evading political characterization, the
court upheld sentencing enhancement for hate crimes
in Wisconsin vs. Mitchell (1993), demanded that
religious speech be provided equal treatment in public
fora in Lamb's Chapel vs. Center Moriches Union
Free School District (1993), and curbed the legal
immunity of prosecutors in Buckley vs. Fitzsimmons
(1993).
Political conservatives could voice satisfaction
with Sale vs. Haitians Center Council (1993),
denying application of asylum laws on the high seas.
Further, their views on church-state, racial
discrimination, abortion and criminal justice prevailed
in Zobrest, Shaw, Hicks, Bray and Johnson.
Moreover, in Alexander vs. United States (1993),
the court denied a First Amendment forfeiture
sanctuary for the assets and profits of racketeers
guilty of trafficking in obscenity. And the standards
for overturning convictions in federal habeas corpus
proceedings were tightened in Brecht vs.
Ab-rahamson (1993).
Nothing on the court's 1993-94 docket suggests
that its diminished prominence on the national
political scene will end. Anticipate another term of
muddled and muffled jurisprudence.
Bruce Fein is a lawyer and free-lance writer
specializing in legal issues.
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The Court: Deciding Less, Writing More
By TED GEST
Copyright 1993 U.S. News & World Report
U.S. News & World Report
June 28, 1993
Vol. 114,, No. 25; Pg. 24
To most Americans, the Supreme Court is a
revered institution that "decides the most significant
questions of our time,* as Bill Clinton put it when he
nominated Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the court last
week. Indeed, in earlier years the court played a
pre-eminent role in resolving delicate issues of
privacy, race and crime. Yet, a close look at its
recent work shows disturbing and puzzling trends:
Not only are the justices writing many fewer opinions
- a projected 108 in the term ending this month
compared with 151 a decade ago - but, in the view
of those who follow the court closely, the quality of
its work is mediocre. A U.S.News & World Report
survey completed by 60 academic experts, regular
practitioners before the court and federal judges rated
the court under William Rehnquist, chief justice since
1986, average or below in key measures of quality.
As the term winds down, the court's agenda
seems small compared with the era between 1953 and
1986, when Earl Warren and Warren Burger
presided. "It is striking that there are so few cases of
great public importance," says Lloyd Cutler, a
prominent Washington lawyer. The court's
unwillingness to settle many disputes leaves much
legal doctrine unsettled and creates inequities based
on geography. And many litigants who might have
expected a generation ago that the court would
resolve issues involving their basic rights can no
longer be so sure the nation's highest tribunal will
hear them. The justices behave as if they are
"punching a time clock," says law Prof. Thomas
Merrill of Northwestern University, a former law
clerk there. "They are disinclined to hear cases and
many they do decide are handled in a perfunctory
manner."
That view was echoed in the U.S. News survey,
which solicited a wide range of conservative and
liberal views. Experts were asked to compare the
Rehnquist, Burger and Warren courts and to assess
the quality of the current justices' work. Asked to
rate courts of different eras in deciding the "most
significant legal issues in a timely fashion,"
respondents ranked Rehnquist's court far below the
Warren tribunal.
This is a sharp contrast from a decade ago, when
justices and scholars were bemoaning how the court
was drowning in cases. With the problem seemingly
destined to worsen, critics suggested a new national
court to decide important issues the justices were
unable to hear. The idea faded as the court started
cutting down on its own. The docket may shrink
further after Byron White retires from the court. He
was often the lone voice beseeching his colleagues to
expand the docket. Usually, his pleas came to no
avail.
The justices offer no public explanations of why
their output has plummeted, but several factors are at
work. Philosophically, the conservatives who have
dominated the court in recent years want to limit its
role in American life. With two thirds of the
lower-court judges named by conservative presidents,
the justices see fewer cases they want to overturn. In
fact, lower-court rulings that favor persons charging
civil-rights violations make up the largest single
category of cases that has disappeared from the high
court's docket, says a study by law Prof. Arthur
Hellman of the University of Pittsburgh.
Real losers. But the main losers as the docket
shrivels are those disputing vital, if less visible,
issues like taxes, pensions, federal benefits and
maritime law. Such cases end up being decided by
the 11 federal appeals courts, whose views on
identical issues often conflict.
Consider the case of ocean explorers hoping to
claim gold they had located on an 1857 shipwreck.
An appeals court in Richmond decided, 7 to 5, that
the ship's insurers, not the explorers, had the right to
gold located on the SS Central America off South
Carolina. That conclusion differed from rulings by
courts in Boston, Atlanta and New Orleans that
explorers in similar cases could keep what they
found. The justices' refusal to resolve the issue, says
the explorers' attorney, Richard Robol, will
discourage ocean exploration.
Pension law is another subject that stirs little
interest in the Marble Palace. Engineer Richard
Fisher of Tennessee retired in 1985 and found that
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his expected benefits excluded credit for work
between 1958 and 1964, when he switched to the
payroll of a company that had bought the firm where
he worked. He eventually returned to the pension
plan of his first employer. The question was whether
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) protected him. Three federal courts
looking at similar disputes took the view that it did.
But four other courts, including the Cincinnati panel
that decided Fisher's case, said the law did not cover
cases like his. The high court stayed out, dashing
Fisher's hope for a much higher pension.
The justices' hands-off stance affects others who
happened to live in the wrong locations. When Shell
Oil Co. ended George Hinkleman's franchise to
manage a gas station in Pasadena, Md., the
Richmond-based appeals court said he was not
entitled to compensation under a law enacted to aid
entrepreneurs like him. Although courts in
Philadelphia, Cincinnati and Chicago took an
opposing view, the high court rejected consideration
of Hinkleman's appeal. Now, he is barely getting by
on Social Security.
Unfairness. In criminal cases, courts often issue
conflicting interpretations of sentencing guidelines.
Different results on issues like whether possessing a
gun amounts to a violent crime can vary a term by 10
years. Criminal-law expert Fred Bennett of Catholic
University says the Supreme Court "should be more
vigilant when years of people's liberty are at stake."
In general, experts say it is unfair when chances of
winning depend on litigants' locations. "In a well-run
system, these cases would not be left unresolved,"
says Pittsburgh's Hellman, who is conducting a
federal study of the problem.
Paradoxically, as its caseload has dropped, the
court's verbosity has multiplied. It is deciding half as
many cases each year as in 1940 with twice as many
pages of opinions. John Frank, a Phoenix
constitutional-law expert who calculates that the
current page count of all court rulings runs to 3,000
annually, contends that the outpouring of verbiage
lowers the overall quality of the court's work
product. Experts surveyed by U.S. News agreed,
rating Rehnquist's tribunal below its immediate
predecessors in such qualities as the analysis of legal
issues and the accurate expression of legal doctrine.
When the justices disagree among themselves, it
is typical for them to issue separate opinions noting
dissent from sections, paragraphs and even sentences
of their colleagues' work. Last week, David Souter
issued a ruling in a pension case in which Antonin
Scalia refused to join "Part III-B-1-b," and Sandra
Day O'Connor did not "join the sentence to which
[footnote] 29 is attached." A handful of observers
praise the court for stating precisely where each
member stands rather than papering over differences.
But most analysts agree with Prof. Eugene Gressman
of Seton Hall University, co-author of a widely used
text on the court, who calls the "ungodly fractured
opinions' a "terrible way of making decisions that
makes it very difficult to figure out the result."
The justices are bound to disagree on controversial
questions of abortion, church-state separation and
affirmative action. However, they also do a poor job
of resolving less visible issues that affect large
numbers of citizens. A few recent examples:
Federal programs. Last year, the court threw out
an appeal charging that Illinois was mishandling a
federal effort to place children in foster care. A
footnote by Rehnquist cast doubt on a wide range of
challenges to programs involving children, the elderly
and disabled, setting off a flurry of expensive
litigation nationwide over which cases could be
pursued. Because the court had not heard arguments
on that issue in the Illinois case, says Dean John
Kramer of Tulane School of Law, even some of the
justices "did not understand what was at stake."
Now, both social-reform advocates and state officials
are lobbying Congress to negate the effects of the
ruling.
Pension law. Experts agree that the justices often
fail when they try to tackle the intricacies of ERISA.
In an article, "The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts,"
Yale law Prof. John Langbein picked apart a 1989
decision that unexpectedly permitted broad court
reviews of pension protests by employees, instead of
deferring to pension administrators in all but extreme
cases.
Taxes. Critics cite murky opinions on tax issues as
another court shortcoming. In one infamous example
last January, the court denied a Virginia
anesthesiologist's claim for a deduction for expenses
of business done at his home. Some experts gripe that
the justices are oblivious to the way small businesses
operate; others say the fault lies with tax-law writers.
In any case, it was impossible to draw firm
conclusions from the case about who is eligible for
the deduction. "The ruling muddied the waters so
much that it is difficult to advise clients," says David
Sokolow, the doctor's attorney.
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In another tax issue bedeviling the court, the
justices ruled last week that Virginia must refund
improper taxes on federal workers' retirement
benefits. But dissenter O'Connor complained that the
court's "hopelessly muddled" doctrines will introduce
"uncertainty and disorder into this already chaotic
area."
Consensus: mediocre. Why does the court so often
fall short? Few say it aloud for fear of alienating
powerful jurists, but the consensus is that they are a
mediocre bunch. Many think only Justice Antonin
Scalia, an ex-professor known for clear writing and
bold opinions, ranks close to previous court giants.
The increasing reliance by justices on young law
clerks is blamed for much of the problem. In simpler
times, justices did most of their own work. But as
more petitions have poured into the court for review,
clerks have done most screening of incoming cases
and writing of first-opinion drafts. Although typically
the top graduates of elite law schools, they are
inexperienced in the real world of litigation. And
with only one year to make a mark, many would
rather spend time on high-profile issues than slog
through nuances of tax law. "They want to be able to
say they wrote critical memos in exciting cases," says
court expert Karen O'Connor of Emory University.
Given the shorter docket, she says, clerks write
longer drafts and justices say, "If they went to all
that trouble, I'll leave in their material."
A few analysts dare to suggest that the justices try
harder. In "The Intelligible Constitution," a book
published last year, Yale law Prof. Joseph Goldstein
argued that the justices do a poor job of
communicating their views. Contending that the court
has an "obligation to maintain the Constitution as
something we the people can understand," he
recommended that instead of merely issuing decisions
after exchanging written drafts, justices should meet
privately to review pending opinions to clarify
ambiguities. Goldstein's ideas have been endorsed by
such experts as liberal Yale colleague Burke Marshall
and conservative ex-judge Robert Bork, but so far
there is no indication that the justices agree such a
step is warranted.
The splintering of opinions may be reduced by the
likely ascendancy of Ginsburg. Last year, she
declared that "overindulgence in individualistic
judging is counterproductive" and called for courts to
function more as collegial bodies that stress "retreat,
accommodation and compromise." Yet she would be
only one member of an institution that operates as
nine fiercely independent law offices. Change will
come only slowly to a court that lacks coherence on
pressing legal issues.
Ranking the justices
Sixty prominent experts consulted by U.S. News -
academics, appellate lawyers and lower-court judges
of wide ideological views and legal specialties -
rated members of the Supreme Court on these
qualities:
Analyzing legal issues
BEST: Antonin Scalia, John Paul Stevens
WORST: Clarence Thomas
Articulating views persuasively
BEST: Antonin Scalia
WORST: Clarence Thomas
Providing clear guidance to litigants
BEST: Antonin Scalia
WORST: Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens
Winning justices' support for their views
BEST: Sandra Day O'Connor, David Souter
WORST: Antonin Scalia
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SUPREME COURT GOES ASTRAY IN STRESSING 'MOTIVE'
By Alan Dershowitz, United Feature Syndicate
The Buffalo News
July 6, 1993, Tuesday, City Edition
VIEWPOINTS; Pg. 3
As the Supreme Court ended its term, one word
seemed to characterize several of its most important
decisions. That word is "motive." The high court set
down a series of rules, in a diverse array of cases,
requiring lower court judges to assess the underlying
motive behind the actions of state and federal
legislators. This will prove to be a difficult, if not
impossible, task in many situations, though in the
cases before the justices the job was made to look
fairly easy.
In the racial gerrymandering case - Shaw vs. Reno
- a narrow majority of the justices ruled that if a
state legislature "purposefully" creates a voting
district based on race alone, its actions may violate
the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The
majority acknowledged that it may sometimes be
difficult to prove such an underlying racial motive,
but it assured the lower courts that "it seems clear to
us that proof sometimes will not be difficult at all."
But they are wrong - at least insofar as future
gerrymands are concerned, since legislatures will try
to hide their real motives precisely in order to
circumvent judicial scrutiny. If the past is any guide,
we can expect a long series of cat-and-mouse games
by determined legislatures and equally determined
courts.
In another well-known case - Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye vs. Hialeah - the Supreme Court ruled
that a ban on animal sacrifices was unconstitutional
because the ban was motivated by a desire to outlaw
the religious sacraments of a particularly unpopular
tiny church in Florida.
Just a few years earlier, the high court had upheld
a general ban on the use of peyote, even though the
ban prevented a group of Native Americans from
practicing their religion. That general ban, the court
ruled, was not motivated by a desire to outlaw the
sacraments of a particular religion. It was thus a
perfectly constitutional criminal statute from which
the Peyote Native Americans had no right to be
exempted.
But under these two cases, how would the court
decide whether, for example, a general ban on infant
circumcision was motivated by anti-Jewish and/or
anti-Muslim attitudes or by other, more neutral
considerations? What if some legislators were
motivated - consciously or unconsciously - by
improper considerations and others by proper
considerations? Would the legislators have to be
called as witnesses, and would psychiatric or political
experts have to testify as to their real motivations?
In a case involving the forfeiture of valuable
property and assets from a convicted criminal,
several of the justices focused on whether the
legislation authorizing the forfeitures was motivated
by a desire to punish rather than regulate. If
punishment was a motive, then the "cruel and
unusual" prohibition of the Eighth Amendment might
limit the amounts of forfeitures, but not if the motive
was regulatory. The distinction is difficult to draw,
and any effort to discern the primary motives of
legislatures rushing to enact tough anti-crime
legislation will be elusive.
In sending judges on this wild goose chase for the
real motive underlying legislation, perhaps the
Supreme Court should have paid more attention to
its own opinion in the case challenging the use of
junk science in the courtroom. In that case --
Daubert vs. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals - the
court instructed judges to scrutinize scientific
testimony with great care before accepting it for use
in the courtroom. Any decent scientist would have
told the justices that their effort to turn judges into
amateur psychoanalysts in quest of the elusive
legislative motive is doomed to failure.
In a world of self-serving legislative horse trading,
rampant influence peddling, special interest lobbying,
staff-drafted legislation, and simple old-fashioned
corruption, the ultimate junk science is trying to get
at the motives of legislatures.
The current Supreme Court - because it is
comprised almost exclusively of promoted lower
court judges and professors, with little experience in
politics or the trial court - reflects a naivete rarely
seen in the history of our high court. Nor will the
addition of Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg improve on
this inadequacy. She, too, is a professor turned
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occasional appellate advocate turned appellate judge.
President Clinton was right to point to the need of
at least some justices with political experience.
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SCALIA: CAPTAIN OF A SHIP THAT MAY NEVER COME IN
CONSERVATIVE JUSTICE FIGHTS ON ALONE
By LYLE DENNISTON Washington Bureau
Baltimore Morning Sun - Saturday, May 15, 1993
WASHINGTON - When the Yankees play at Camden
Yards, a famous - and devoted - fan of theirs
sometimes can be found in a good seat there. But not
easily. He will blend in perfectly, wearing an
ordinary baseball cap and glasses. He won't look a
thing like Antonin Scalia.
It may be only at the ballpark that Justice Scalia
really blends in. At the Supreme Court, where he
works as the nation's premier showman - judge -
theoretician, he is a loner who is losing regularly in
a stubborn fight to protect the true conservative
cause against the "balancers," the moderates in the
middle of the road who are now in control.
To him, it doesn't always matter greatly that his
side loses. As he once said to a companion after
watching the Orioles beat the Yankees at Camden
Yards, "It was a great game - but it turned out
wrong!"
Certainly, he can fight back verbally when he loses
in a big way within the court, but this man known for
his charm always insists that there is nothing
personal about it. He has a barbed wit and barbed
computer keys, and both frequently leave stings -
unintentionally, he will say fervently.
He is a loner mainly because he remains the
solitary captain of the conservative revolution that
never quite happened at the court. Practically alone,
he is what is left over from the attempt to
"Reaganize" the Supreme Court, turning it into a
deeply conservative bastion where new rights no
longer emerge from "activist" judges, and even old
rights get strongly diluted if not dissolved.
At the tender age, for a justice, of 57 and after
only seven terms on the court, Antonin Scalia is on
the verge of becoming a historical curiosity, perhaps
already "a figure of the past," as an admirer, Bruce
Fein, Washington lawyer and former official with
the Ronald Reagan administration, tentatively
phrases it. "I don't see on the horizon that we're
going to get more people (on the court) like Scalia."
It is an assessment that is shared by some liberals,
too. Says Harvard law professor and constitutional
expert Kathleen Sullivan, a sometime-adviser to the
Clinton administration: Justice Scalia's "hard-edged
judicial conservatism has failed to take hold at the
court; it has been overtaken by the more moderate
approach of the balancers."
Justice Scalia is not expected to get an ally when
President Clinton names a replacement for retiring
Justice Byron R. White within the next few weeks.
When the court is divided, Justice Scalia seldom
leads a majority, and he is able as a routine to count
only upon Justice Clarence Thomas' voting with
him. Even Justice Thomas, however, insists in
private encounters that he is independent of any
"bloc" on the court, including any two-man bloc with
Justice Scalia.
The two great ambitions of the "Reagan
revolution" that Justice Scalia was to help gain within
the court - completely ending the constitutional right
to abortion and bringing prayer back to the public
schools - were never achieved. Abortion rights
remain, even if narrower in scope, and prayers are
still banned from public education - both the result
of 5-4 rulings last year, with Justice Scalia on the
losing side on both.
The main reason those causes were lost is that
three other appointees to the court during the 12
years of the Reagan and George Bush administrations
do not share the pure dogma of the constitutional
faith of those administrations. Those three are the
so-called "balancers": Justices Sandra Day O'Connor,
Anthony M. Kennedy and David H. Souter.
The pure "Reagan-Bush" legal dogma is, in reality,
dogma borrowed in considerable part from Justice
Scalia himself. His judicial philosophy has three basic
theories at its center:
* First, law works best when it is embodied in a
hard, fast and clear-cut rule that people must obey
and judges must enforce loyally - letting legislatures
deal with any hardships that result.
* Second, laws are best understood by their literal
words and the ordinary meanings those words had
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when the laws were written.
* Third, the Constitution is to be understood, and
applied, as the 18th-century authors intended in the
beginning; it does not change with the times or shifts
in public sentiment.
"He came to the court," Harvard professor
Sullivan recalls, "with the clearest intellectual agenda
of anyone on the court in a long time." And, because
that agenda is simplicity itself - rules are rules, and
words mean what they say - "it is easy to judge
(Justice Scalia's) successes and failures." His most
"notable failures," the professor suggests, were on
abortion and school prayer.
To Justice Scalia, the Constitution's silence on
abortion means that there is no such right there. He
sees no sign that the authors of the Bill of Rights
wanted prayers banned from the public schools. And,
on a host of federal civil rights laws, he is openly
hostile to reading them in the most expansive way
the words can be read; if legislators don't write what
they mean into law, judges should not supply any
broader meanings, he thinks.
Within the current court, he loses more often on
constitutional decisions than on those based on laws
written by Congress or state legislatures. Whether he
loses or wins on anything, though, Justice Scalia
shows no signs of changing and no signs of
withdrawing from the fray.
"It is hard to imagine him just receding from
view," Ms. Sullivan remarks.
Indeed, the public image of the court would be
profoundly changed if Justice Scalia were to recede
from his most visible role, from the one part of the
court's life and work where he remains the dominant
figure. That is in the court's public "theater," its
hearings on cases.
That is Justice Scalia's stage. Just why it is could
be seen during a lively 60 minutes recently in a case
on a fundamentalist church's plea for the right to
hold worship services in a public school in the small
Long Island town of Center Moriches, N.Y.
The two lawyers fielded a total of 209 questions -
82 from Justice Scalia; no other justice had half that
many. But sitting through 82 Scalia questions may
not be an endurance test for the audience; it can be
entertainment. It also can be a vivid display of
Justice Scalia's clever use of sarcasm to make his
In the Center Moriches case, it was clear that
Justice Scalia could see little wrong with using
public school buildings for prayer services. He
seemed drawn to the basic argument of the lawyer for
Lamb's Chapel, the fundamentalist church, that
having worship in a schoolhouse would contribute to
community welfare.
And so he was troubled about something he had
read in the case - presumably, the night before, in
his usual diligent preparation for a hearing. It was
something in the other side's defense of banning
rituals from the school building. The claim, made by
New York's attorney general, siding with the school
board, was that religion is for those who already
believe, not for the good of the community.
Acting offended, Justice Scalia started working on
the school board's lawyer about that comment.
Giving no hint of where he would be going, the
justice asked, "I grew up in New York state, and in
those days, they used to have a tax exemption for
religious property. Is that still there?"
The lawyer said it was.
"But," Justice Scalia went on, "they've changed
their view, apparently. You see, it used to be thought
that . . . a God-fearing person might be less likely
to mug me and rape my sister. That apparently is not
the view of New York anymore."
His point was becoming clear: He was needling
New York for disparaging religion as a moral force,
and he wanted the other justices to focus on that, to
entice them into letting more religion into the
schools.
As is so often true with Justice Scalia, however, he
was not content to leave it at a contrast of the change
in morals in New York; the thought needed a punch
line, preferably a funny one. With a straight face, as
if he were entirely serious, he dropped the line: "Has
this new regime worked very well?"
Gales of laughter rocked the court room, partly
because the line was a wonderful put-down, partly
because Justice Scalia's humor is admired at least for
its cleverness: Supreme Court arguments are not
usually made of such stuff.
Joining in the laughter, tilting her head back with
delight on her face, was Justice O'Connor, who
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seldom appreciates Justice Scalia's domination or his
one-liners. Her jaw noticeably tightens when he
starts a round of inquiries to a lawyer.
Indeed, that same hearing provided a small vignette
into why Justice Scalia's control of an argument
sometimes, perhaps frequently, unsettles his
colleagues. At one point, in the midst of one of the
Scalia barrages, Justice O'Connor tried to get in a
question. She was cut off after two words and had to
wait for eight more Scalia questions before an
opportunity came.
Even some of Justice Scalia's close friends seem
somewhat put off by his theatrics on the bench. A
liberal Circuit Court judge, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
who notes that she is very fond of Justice Scalia from
their years as colleagues on the U.S. Court of
Appeals, was discussing at a party recently her
friend's performances as the self-cast star of the
show: "Oh, Nino," she said maternally. "Sometimes
I could just shake him!"
Those performances, Justice Scalia's admirers
suggest, are part of his intellectual playfulness -
and, perhaps, a display of intellectual arrogance.
Washington lawyer Fein says: "I would distinguish
between arrogance in a social setting and intellectual
arrogance. In a social setting, that is not his
personality at all - he is not a pretentious character.
On the other hand, there's certainly more than a
grain of truth to his general disposition not to look
kindly upon people who haven't done their
intellectual homework as he has."
The image of Justice Scalia as a self-absorbed
showoff is now clearly a part of the popular culture:
A few blocks from the Supreme Court, a bookstore
prominently displays "The Supreme Court: A Paper
Doll Book," lampooning each of the justices. On the
pages for "Nino" Scalia, the book jokes that the last
book he has read is an unpublished autobiography,
"The Brilliant Life and Times of Antonin Scalia."
Justice Scalia is said to be well aware of that image
and seeks simply to brush it off in private. But some
of his private comments reveal a relish for being the
dominant one in a group; one conversational partner
recalled the justice's talking with gusto about the
pleasure of sitting at the head of a table filled with
his family of nine children. "It was the authority of
it," said that individual.
The justice is seen fairly often on Washington's
social circuit, but there, he seems not to affect the
self-importance that others observe in him on the
bench. Says one party companion: "He is very
amiable, very sociable - and I've seen him just
walk around the room, drinking a beer out of a
bottle."
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KENNEDY BECOMES KEY VOTE ON SUPREME COURT
By LYLE DENNISTON, Washington Bureau
Baltimore Morning Sun - Sunday July 18, 1993
Copyright The Baltimore Sun 1993
WASHINGTON - Washington. - With a keen eye
for small detail, a disdain for the grand and showy
gesture, a passion for talking one-on-one, an appetite
for scholarly summers in Austria, a taste for
fine red wines, and a yearning to know more art
history, Anthony M. Kennedy is a modern refugee
from a bygone era of the salon.
He is, by his own unabashed suggestion to his
intimates, a cultured fellow - seeming, at a glance,
somewhat out of place in the contentious circles of
power in Washington, more at home perhaps as the
ambassador to the Court of St. James in London, as
one friend suggests.
But this, too, is the individual who holds
what may well be the most powerful single vote on
the U.S. Supreme Court. The 56-year-old justice uses
that vote, along with the soothing balm of
mild-mannered caution, to see that the court does not
go running off to extremes, left or right.
As decision after decision by the court over
more than five years illustrates, a big, difficult
and contentious case can rarely be won without
Justice Kennedy's vote. It began to happen within
weeks after the Reagan appointee became a justice
in the late winter of 1988, and it was happening right
up to the end of the term just past.
"What's striking about him," suggests law
professor Paul Marcus of the College of William and
Mary, "is what he could have done, but didn't."
Focusing on just two highly symbolic questions
the court has faced - whether to overturn Roe vs.
Wade, the 1973 abortion ruling, and whether to close
the federal courthouses to almost all cases involving
police failure to give "Miranda warnings" to suspects
they arrest - Mr. Marcus notes that Mr. Kennedy's
vote helped make the 5-4 majorities not to do either.
"If he had voted the other way, we would have had
two major changes in the law, with wide
ramifications."
"For me," the professor adds, "the word for him
is 'cautious.' "
. That sentiment is echoed by others. "There is an
element of gradualism and caution in Kennedy,"
says a former court aide, now a Washington
attorney, who spoke on condition of anonymity, as
did a number of those who agreed to discuss their
views on Mr. Kennedy or their personal dealings
with him.
The justice, that lawyer says, is in the majority
most of the time be- cause of that approach.
Realizing that "it is very hard to get five votes for a
categorical result" - a result that seeks to settle
a major controversy once and for all, with the
certainty and clarity of a hard-and-fast rule -
Mr. Kennedy prefers, instead, to go for the least that
it will take to get a decision in a case.
But there is more to this justice's seeming power
and to his steady move toward prominence: He
acts out, more than any other justice does, the
personality of the Supreme Court that currently sits.
"He personifies where the court is," suggests
Georgetown University law professor David Cole:
"He is the most right-wing of the moderates, and he
is the most moderate of the right-wing
conservatives. He swings back and forth between the
moderating forces and the right wing."
Mr. Cole adds that "Kennedy, and the court,
swung to the right" in the term that ended in late
June. "If he continues to maintain a fairly
right-wing perspective, that is where the court will
be; if he moderates his views, the court will, too."
Says a former Kennedy law clerk: "He does not
have fixed views on a lot of subjects, does not judge
by reference to a fixed ideology. He gets there by his
own internal processes." Adds Mr. Marcus: "He is
still feeling where he's going, but he's going to be a
pretty important figure on the court" as the years
pass.
If Mr. Kennedy is inclined to join another
justice's opinion, but then finds that justice putting
something sweeping into a decision, Mr. Kennedy
will back off, says another former law clerk.
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"He will say, 'We don't have to do this,' "
and will disassociate himself from the grander
declarations - even if they are contained only in an
isolated footnote.
The one field of law in which Mr. Kennedy is
developing what one friend calls "a very powerful
set of beliefs" is the First Amendment's protection of
free speech and of press freedom.
'Keeper of the flame'
"He sees himself as the keeper of the flame on
that," the friend adds, now that Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr., the architect of most of the court's
modem doctrine on the First Amendment, has
retired.
One of Mr. Kennedy's most "courageous"
acts, according to several academic observers of
his work, was to vote with the majority in the
court's two 5-4 rulings to protect burning the
American flag as a form of political protest under the
First Amendment.
The fact that Mr. Kennedy has chosen to try
to make a mark on free speech issues serves, in
part, only to reinforce the image of him as a justice
who, on practically everything else, is open to
persuasion and to shifting alliances.
That is a characteristic that some lawyers and
some academics find disconcerting - especially those
who try to figure out how to argue a case to win Mr.
Kennedy's vote.
Says a lawyer who repeatedly appears before
the court: "He is such a blank slate, such a
weathervane; it is remarkable how easy it is for him
to take inconsistent positions, and then convince
himself that he did not."
The proof that such critics offer as their
irrefutable example is Mr. Kennedy's record on
abortion, especially the 1989 ruling that came close
to dismantling Roe vs. Wade and with it the
constitutional right to abortion, and then the 1992
ruling that surprisingly reaffirmed a right to abortion
(though narrower in its scope). Both were decided by
5-4 votes, and in both Mr. Kennedy was in the
majority.
The recently released court papers of the late
Justice Thurgood Marshall reveal that Justice
Kennedy was a willing partner, from first to last,
with Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist in an
effort in 1989 to make abortion rights all but
disappear.
From the moment that Mr. Rehnquist declared
at the justices' first private discussion of the 1989
case from Missouri that he "disagrees with Roe vs.
Wade" but would "not overrule [itisuch, " he had Mr.
Kennedy as an ally in a two-month, behind-the-
scenes campaign to pare Roe down so that state
legislatures would be far more free to regulate
abortion throughout all of a woman's pregnancy -
not just in the last third of pregnancy, when few
abortions would be done anyway.
And yet, three years later, as a packed courtroom
listened to the oral rendition of the new decision
in a Pennsylvania case partly reaffirming Roe, Mr.
Kennedy would speak as one of the three authors of
that ruling, and was heard to say that the Roe
decision "was well within our constitutional
heritage," and to comment: "The destiny of the
woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place
in society."
The new decision allowed state intervention in the
abortion choice only after the fetus had reached the
point where it could survive outside the woman's
body, and not throughout pregnancy, as the
Rehnquist opinion of 1989 suggested.
Flipper'
It seemed such a sharp shift for Mr. Kennedy
that, at a private term-ending party that year, law
clerks would refer to Mr. Kennedy in a skit as
"Flipper." And a former law clerk of his reportedly
telephoned two conservative newspaper columnists,
Robert Novak and Rowland Evans, who had been
critical of the abortion ruling, to reveal the inside
secret that Mr. Kennedy actually had switched his
vote to help rescue the right to abortion. The
former clerk apparently was unhappy with the switch.
Mr. Kennedy has never explained publicly how
he could have cast the deciding vote in both of
those decisions, and former clerks who were willing
to be interviewed about him refused to be drawn into
discussions of the background of either of the rulings.
But those who have worked closely with him
or watched him fromother chambers down the
corridor do suggest that it is not much of a surprise
that he would be found in differing voting alliances,
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regularly and often.
"He is always willing to reconsider old positions,"
says a former court clerk familiar with Mr.
Kennedy's work. "There was no point where, if a
clerk had something new to say, that he wouldn't
hear them out. He was always willing to sit down and
chat about a case - and at any stage of the case."
'Quite ready to struggle'
Mr. Cole, who has twice had Justice Kennedy as
a guest lecturer in the constitutional law class he
teaches at Georgetown, said that the justice "is really
quite ready to struggle, openly, for the right
answers."
That, of course, is not a hallmark of the conduct of
most justices. When they commit themselves to a
position and start it down the road of deliberation
among the nine, they are not open to suggestions for
wholesale changes. If someone wants something
fundamental altered, a polite suggestion is likely
to come back that that justice write a separate
opinion.
"The dirty little secret around the Supreme
Court," suggests a former Kennedy clerk, "is that the
justices make hardly any changes."
Mr. Kennedy, though, is known to his close
associates as one who is very open to others' ideas -
and not, they say, because of a "Flipper" approach to
jurisprudence. "His opinions will go through a lot
of drafts" even before leaving his chambers to be
circulated to the other justices, and new ideas get
dropped in regularly, an ex-clerk says.
The justice tends to write a memo to himself,
shortly before he goes to a court conference for
the first vote on a case. "After he had reached
tentative views about a case, he would write, dictate
or produce a memo to himself, describing his
rationale," says a former associate.
Then, the law clerks will be assigned to write
a first draft of an opinion, if Mr. Kennedy has been
assigned a writing chore on a case. It is then, some
of his former clerks say, that the justice begins to
exert his own stylistic preferences.
One ex-clerk remembers that the justice does not
like words that end in "ly," thinking they are
weaker. Another recalls that footnotes were to be
avoided, wherever possible. Some have called
these rules "quirky," but others remember them as
simply examples of Mr. Kennedy's desire that his
opinions bear his style.
"Kennedy prides himself on his craftsmanship,"
says one former clerk.
The justice is very attentive to details, those who
have worked with him say. He apparently can
become fascinated by unusual little points. In the
summer of 1988, preparing for a coming case on the
meaning of an 1866 civil rights law, Mr. Kennedy
read a book titled "Reconstruction," by Eric Foner,
a Columbia University history professor.
Catching a contradiction
On page 245 of the book, the justice found a
comment that contradicted something Mr. Foner and
other scholars had said in a legal brief they filed in
the case describing the history of that law; Mr.
Kennedy relayed that to his colleagues, saying: "I
do think that Foner's brief is highly misleading."
That he would read up on a case, in materials not
directly filed by the lawyers, is something Mr.
Kennedy's law clerks expect of him. He at times has
asked them to consult with the court's library to draw
up reading lists for him, just so that he could "bone
up on a subject," as one former clerk put it.
"He both fancies himself, and actually is,
someone with a broader interest in ideas; he is by
no means a lightweight," says one of his associates.
"Because he is a person of higher culture, some of
his clerks think he is high falutin'.
Intellectual life
Mr. Kennedy does immerse himself in an
intellectual life outside the court; for five summers,
he has taught in a seminar in Salzburg, Austria,
sponsored by the law school in his hometown of
Sacramento, Calif. - the McGeorge School of Law
- where he was a part-time teacher for 23 years
before becoming a justice.
This month, he is teaching a course on
"Fundamental Rights in Europe and the United
States." Those who have been with him in Salzburg
in past years say he takes eagerly to the hiking and
bicycling trails around that region, and that he is
fond of finding "little remote places" to eat, and to
enjoy the red wines.
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"I like him personally," says a sometime
companion during the Salzburg visits. "He is very
affable and fun. And he is quite a classy companion.
He doesn't come off as nearly as stuffy as some have
said he was."
His law clerks, too, say that about Mr.
Kennedy. "He doesn't have piques, flares of
temper, and he does not nurse grudges," says a
former clerk. "He has an Irishman's soul -
combined with his suburban manners. I find him very
poetic and very soulful; it's a little bit surprising."
KENNEDY: EQUAL VOTE, EXTRA POWER
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy casts only one of
the nine votes on the Supreme Court, but his has
been a powerful and often decisive one in his more
than five years on the highest tribunal. A sampling of
some of the most important decisions the court has
reached during his service shows his role and his
vote:
ABORTION
In majority:
5-4 decision (1989): Roe vs. Wade decision (1973)
establishing a right to abortion is narrowed, so that
abortion may be regulated throughout pregnancy by
state law.
5-4 (1991): The government has authority to forbid
doctors and nurses at federally funded clinics from
talking about abortions.
5-4 (1992): Right of abortion established in Roe
vs. Wade is partly reaffirmed, but the constitutional
standard for striking down state laws is relaxed.
Wrote part of majority opinion, with Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor and Justice David H. Souter.
6-3 (1990): States may require that one parent be
notified before a teenager may get an abortion. Wrote
majority opinion.
RACE RELATIONS
In majority:
5-4 decision (1989): An 1866 civil rights law
banning race bias only protects workers from bias in
hiring, not firing. Wrote majority opinion.
5-4 (1993): It is unconstitutional for state
legislatures to pass redistricting plans that pack
minority voters from scattered areas into a voting
district.
In dissent:
5-4 decision (1990): Federal judges may order
local governments to raise taxes to pay the cost of
desegregating public schools. Wrote dissenting
opinion.
5-4 (1990): Congress has the constitutional power
to require that some benefits or opportunities be
allotted on the basis of race. Wrote dissenting
opinion.
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
In majority:
5-4 decision (1989): The federal government may
require mandatory drug testing of workers holding
sensitive jobs in law enforcement. Wrote majority
opinion.
FREE EXPRESSION
In majority:
5-4 decision (1989): The Constitution protects
burning the American flag as a political protest.
5-4 (1991): States and cities may ban nude dancing
by performers in barrooms and adult theaters.
RELIGION
In majority:
5-4 decision (1988): The government may pay
religious organizations to teach teenagers to avoid
sex and pregnancy, so long as the funds do not
finance teaching of dogma.
5-4 (1992): It is unconstitutional for public school
officials to arrange for any prayers at graduation
exercises. Wrote majority opinion.
5-4 decision (1993): The Constitution allows
government to provide benefits to students at
parochial schools, even if that means public funds are
used to support one faith's beliefs.
9-0 (1993): It is unconstitutional for a local
government to single out the rituals of one religious
faith, and ban that activity, even when the practice is
animal sacrifice. Wrote majority opinion.
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
In majority:
5-4 decision (1991): The Constitution allows states
to punish first-time offenders for possessing illegal
drugs with mandatory life in prison without parole.
Wrote one of opinions for split majority.
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9-0 (1993): States may constitutionally add extra
penalties to ordinary crimes if the victim was selected
soley because of race, religion, sex or ethnic identity.
Joined Rehnquist opinion.
Lyle Denniston covers the Supreme Court and
legal issues for the Washington bureau of The
Baltimore Sun.
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Independent Justice
David Souter Emerges
As Reflective Moderate
On the Supreme Court
His Defense of Roe vs. Wade,
Run-Ins With Scalia Irk
His Conservative Backers
Talk of a Mighty Threesome
By PAUL M. BARRETT
Staff Reporter of Tiue WAL. STRE. JOURNAL
WASHINGTON - To acquaintances,
Justice David Souter still seems amazed at
times to find himself on the Supreme
Court.
"He is almost reverent about . .. the
court," says Thomas Rath, a lawyer and
close friend. "He sees his role and the
court's as healer of the divisions in
the country."
That's a far cry from what conserva-
tives thought they were getting when Pres-
Ident Bush in July
1990 chose the ob-
scure New Hamp-
shire jurist to suc-
ceed liberal giant
William Brennan on
the high court. The
White House as-
sured the GOP hard
right that David
Souter would be "a
home run."
The Bush ad-
ministration was
"miserably inaccu- David Souter
rate," complains
Thomas Jipping, vice president of the Free
Congress Foundation, which coordinated
support for the nomination among conser-
vative groups. He says that Justice Souter
has been "horrible in some of the real
fundamental areas." Exhibit A was last
June's abortion ruling, in which the court,
by a 5-4 vote, rebuffed the Bush adminis-
tration's push to overturn Roe vs. Wade,
the 1973 decision that established a consti-
tutional right to abortion. Justice Souter
contributed an assertive opinion for the
majority stressing the court's need to
maintain precedent and resist outside po-
litical pressures.
Justice Souter, 53 years old, is far from
a flaming liberal. But as his third term
unfolds, the man who was called a "stealth
nominee" has surprised legal scholars who
had questioned his credentials and seem-
ingly narrow life experience as a reclusive
bachelor. He is becoming a major force on
the conservative court by means of inde-
pendent thinking and strong personal alli-
ances with other justices. Should President
Clinton appoint one or more liberal jus-
tices, some scholars predict that Justice
Souter would emerge as the anchor of a
moderate center on a divided court.
Judge Who?
"Who is this guy? I never heard of
him," was law professor David Strauss's
first reaction to word of the Souter nomina-
tion 212 years ago. Now the University of
Chicago constitutional law expert calls
Justice Souter "unusually thoughtful."
In the 18 cases decided by a 5-4 vote last'
term and so far this term, Mr. Souter has
been in the majority 14 times - more often
than any other justice. Moreover. he has
shown he is willing to do battle with the
court's most articulate conservative, Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia. They are likely to
clash again In two cases on religion in
public education that will be argued later
this month.
"People tried to make him into some-
thing he was not." explains Mr. Rath.
They mistook a person who is conservative
politically for one who would be a conser-
vative activist on the bench.
Along with Justices Sandra Day O'Con-
nor and Anthony Kennedy, two colleagues
attracted by his cautiously conservativejurisprudence, Justice Souter is part of a
threesome who serve as a brake on more
ambitious forays to the right by Chief
Justice William Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Clarence Thomas. All of thejustices have been charmed by his courtly,
if occasionally eccentric, personality.
Jingle Bells
Justice O'Connor immediately took to
Mr. Souter, helping him find a church in
Washington and inviting the lifelong bach-
elor to join her and her husband, John,. for
holiday meals and strolls along the city's
C&O Canal. Justice Kennedy likewise went
out of his way to tutor him in the court's
peculiar traditions, including the rule that
the most junior justice must answer the
door if anyone knocks during the weekly
secret conference to discuss cases. Justice
Souter has returned the favor by privately
defending Justice Kennedy against accu-
sations that he flip-flops on controversial
issues.
Though sometimes stuffy in his legal
prose, Justice Souter isn't pompous in
person. Asked why he sings along with the
chief justice at Mr. Rehnquist's annual
Christmas carol party, he replies: "I have
to. Otherwise I get all the tax cases."
On a court riven with resentments, he
quickly endeared himself to his colleagues.
Liberal Justice Harry Blackmun told ajudicial conference in Minneapolis last
summer that Justice Souter may be "the
only normal person on the Supreme
Court." With a smile on his face, Justice
Blackmun .added, "I won't expand on
that."
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The cryptic compliment could well refer
also to Justice Souter's ability to confront
Justice Scalia without rancor. "There is no
question that lie doesn't take (criticism
from Justice Scallal as personally as Ken-
nedy and O'Connor," says a lawyer wno
clerked last term for another justice. Fre-
quently during oral argument, Justices
Souter and Scalla, who sit next to each
other, will duck their heads to share a
private joke. And Justice Scalia surprised
his benchmate one day by bringing him an
oil portrait he had come across of a
19th-century justice named Levi Wood-
bury, the only other person ever to be
living in New Hampshire when named to
the high court.
Yet despite his inclination to mix it up
on the job, Justice Souter hasn't aban-
doned-his ascetic New England ways. Most
days, he drives himself to the court in a
Volkswagen, lunches on yogurt and an
apple, works late into the evening and
returns to a tiny rented apartment that
friends say remains virtually undecorated.-
Renowned for his penny-pinching, he was
dismiyed one day at the $8 price of a
judicial luncheon at the high court. "Oh
David, you're so silly," Justice O'Connor
laughed. "What's so silly about that?" a
genuinely confused Justice Souter later
asked his staff.
Unabashed in his parochialism, Justice
Souter would be happier living in the
ramshackle Weare, N.H., farmhouse
where he grew up and still spends sum-
mers. He avoids the Washington cocktail
circuit and, despising travel of any sort,
skips the out-of-town speaking gigs that a
number of his colleagues enjoy. "He told
us he likes to sleep in his own sheets," says
a former Souter clerk.
For current events, he regularly reads
only the Sunday New York Times. "I gave
him a color TV, but he never plugged the
damned thing in," says - former New
Hampshire Sen. Warren Rudman. Widely
read in history, law and philosophy, the
former Rhodes Scholar keeps up with
contemporary politics mostly by means of
updates from a tight circle of Harvard
classmates and longtime New Hampshire
friends like Mr. Rudman.
*A Friend to Prisoners
Those for whom he makes time in his
work-dominated life find him generous,
gregarious and entertaining, whether re-
counting little-known facts about Oliver
Wendell Holmes or war stories from New
Hampshire politics.
On a recent rare stop at a McDonald's,
Justice Souter mused to a companion that
he hadn't been in one of the fast-food
,restaurants for 20 years. The last time, he
recalled, had been in the early 1970s, when
as New Hampshire attorney general le
supervised the early-morning arrest of
dozens of protesters at the Seabrook nu-
clear power plant. Afterward, prosecutor
Souter went to a McDonald's and used his
own money to buy coffee and breakfast for
his detainees.
Justice Souter doesn't give formal in-
terviews. But he has compared his first
term on the high court to walking Into a
tidal wave. Friends say that he staggered
back to New Hampshire in the summer of
1991 looking drawn and harried. Last sum-
mer, by contrast, he was "much more at
ease,:more self-confident," says federal
Judge Hugh Bownes of Concord.
His self-deprecation characterizes
some of Justice Souter's jurisprudential
clashes with Justice Scalia, who isn't
known for understatement. In a case de-
cided last June, Justice Scalia attacked
a Souter majority for resorting "to that last
hope of lost interpretative causes, that St.
Jude of the hagiology of statutory con-
struction, legislative history." Contending
that congressional debates and committee
reports are unreliable, Justice Scalia has
pushed the court to stick to the "plain
meaning" of statutory text.
The Frankfurter Tradition
In a footnote answering the Scalia gibe,
Justice Souter maintained that "the
shrine" of legislative history "is well
peopled (though it has room for one more)
and its congregation has included such
noted elders as Mr. Justice Frankfurter"
(whose 23 years on the court ended
in 1962). Justice Souter has launched a
forceful counteroffensive against the strin-
gent plain-meaning approach. He contends
that when the court ignores other evidence
of what legislators had in mind, it may
distort the purpose of laws it is asked
to interpret.
Legal scholars say Justice Souter
brings a fresh approach to such debates.
1le "struggles with the arguments on both
sides of cases." says Prof. Strauss. "You
see a kind of humility, which is lacking in
some other members of the court." Lib-
erals disagree with many of Justice
Souter's views but have been relieved by
his performance. "He is certainly conser-
vative on many issues," including crimi-
nal law, says Elliot Mincberg, legal direc-
tor of People for the American Way. "But
we could have done a lot worse. He has
shown some real intellectual independence
from the Scalia wing."
Justice Souter has expressed particular
pride to friends in having reshaped debate
on the court over religion and abortion.
Founders' Intentions
Church-state disputes, for example, in-
evitably provoke questions about constitu-
tional history - which Justice Scalia views
as much more relevant than legislative
history. Justice Scalia contends that to
prevent judges from reading their own
values into the Constitution, such vague
provisions as the First Amendment's ban
on official "establishment of religion"
should be enforced only as they were
understood by the men who drafted them.
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, while
repelled by the more expansive interpreta-
tions of the Warren and Burger courts,
can't bring themselves to accept the un-
bending Scalia view, either. Justice Souter
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argues that while. history is vital in
making constitutional judgments, it pro-
vides few clear-cut answers.
The ferment was on display in last
June's 5-4 ruling in Lee vs. Weisman,
which said that official prayers at a public-
school graduation violated the First
Amendment. In a scathing dissent. Justice
Scalia attacked the majority opinion by
Justice Kennedy for failing to take a
distinct historical point of view. Justice
Scalia cited religious passages from early
presidential addresses to show that offi-
cially sponsored prayer has been accepted
since the country's founding.
Justice Souter joined the majority but
wrote a separate opinion that confronted
Justice Scalia. Justice Souter meticulously
recounted the drafting and revision of the
First Amendment to reach the conclusion
that "history neither contradicts nor war-
rants reconsideration of the settled princi-
ple" that the First Amendment forbids
government support for religion in general
no less than for one religion over others. As
for those early presidents who breached
the wall separating church and state, he
noted historical evidence that James Madi-
son and others were ashamed of having
done so.
Free From Politics
Justice Souter felt so strongly about last
term's abortion decision that he used It to
make a personal statement about the high
court's place in the political system.
Months before the justices even knew
which abortion case they might consider,
he began studying the question of whether
the court should overrule Roe vs. Wade.
Persuaded that the court had overreached
its authority on abortion, Justice Souter
was nonetheless troubled about the ap-
pearance of bowing to conservative pres-
sure to overturn Roe.
After oral arguments last April in the
abortion case from Pennsylvania that the
court ultimately agreed to decide, there
were four votes to overrule: the chief
justice and Justices Scalia, Thomas and
Byron White. At the other extreme were
Roe's stalwart defenders: Justices Black-
mun and John Paul Stevens.
On shaky middle ground were Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy. Long a critic of
Roe's reasoning, Justice O'Connor wanted
to give states more leeway to regulate
abortion, but worried about going too far.
She sought to replace Roe's rigid approach
based on the trimesters of pregnancy with
a flexible standard that would allow more
state regulation but still let judges strike
down restrictions they deem excessive.
Justice Kennedy was even less certain
of how to proceed. Though on the record as
opposing Roe, he felt uncomfortable with
the conservative argument that the Consti-
tution didn't rank the right to abortion any
higher than the right, say, to a driver's
license.
Justice Souter also wanted to coinpro-
mise but had far more confidence In his
solution: Roe, in some form, must be
reaffirmed, he thought. For the court to
reverse itself on such a contentious issue
would encourage the impression of it as
moved by raw politics, not reason. In late
April, he and Justice O'Connor separately
began work on pieces of what would even-
tually form a plurality opinion.
Powerful Threesome
The Souter-O'Connor effort provided
Justice Kennedy with the alternative to
overruling Roe for which he had been
groping. He joined their opinion and added
a section of his own. The core of the
cooperative product was Justice Souter's
assertion that "to overrule under fire in
the absence of thp most compelling reason
to reexamine a watershed decision would
subvert the court's legitimacy beyond any
serious question." He called on comba-
tants In the abortion clash "to end their
national division by accepting a common
mandate rooted in the Constitution."
In heated dissenting opinions, the chief
justice and Justice Scalia sought to iden-
tify weaknesses in Justice Souter's reason-
ing. For one thing, they said, his paean to
upholding precedent had a peculiar echo
when followed by Justice O'Connor's thor-
ough rewriting of Roe to narrow the abor-
tion right. Moreover, they noted that the
plurality opinion also casually overturned
outright two other major decisions on
abortion from the 1980s.
Though troubled by these inconsisten-
cies, Justices Blackmun and Stevens nev-
ertheless signed onto Justice Souter's
piece of the plurality, forming a fragile 5-4
ruling that reaffirmed a narrowed version
of Roe and prohibited states from banning
abortion altogether.
On Sunday, June 28, the day before the
Pennsylvania abortion decision was an-
nounced, Justice Souter telephoned his
friend Mr. Rath in New Hampshire. "I
think my name may be in the paper after
tomorrow," the justice said.
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On the Right
Thomas Is Emerging
As Strong Conservative
Out to Prove Himself
He Often Writes Separately
Even When in Majority,
Sides With Scalia a Lot
The Anger Is. Still Evident
By PAUL M. BARRT
Staff Reporter of Ten WALLSTIMT I JOunNAL
WASHINGTON - Clarence Thomas
tells friends that he intends to serve on the
Supreme Court for 43 years.
. Why 43, exactly? Because, he figures,
that's how old he was when he survived his
confirmation-hearing 'storm over Anita
Hill's sex-harassment charges in 1991. The
world stuck it to him for 43 years; now it's
pay-back time.
As his edgy humor suggests,.Justice
Thomas's anger didn't begin with Ms.
Hill's allegations. It
was kindled in a
segregation-marred
boyhood and smol-
dered for years as:
he encountered ac-
cusations that, as a
black conservative,
he was necessarily
a hypocrite.
Now he is set-
(ling in after 18
months at the Su-
preme Court, carv-
ing out a role as one Clarence Thomas
of the most conser-
vative justices on a conservative court - a
role he will pursue more adamantly, people
close to him say, as President Clinton
appoints liberal justiced to replace retiring
Justice Byron White apd other aging mem-
bers of the court.
Ilis anger over what he called his
"high-tech lynching" before the Senate
Judiciary Committee hasn't completely
dissipated. Justice Thomas, who vehe-
mently denied Ms. Hill's charges, had long
feared some sort of retribution for being
"an uppity black man," as he has put it.
*His ersatz trial before millions of televi-
sion viewers "was that nightmare come
-true," says Clint Bolick, a Thomas friend
and former aide. "Certainly, lie is scarred
by it. How couldn't he be?"
One way Justice Thomas reacted to the
confirmation spectacle has been to retreat.
Never much of a socialite, he withdrew
-further into a small circle of friends and
conservative law clerks. lie tells friends
that he stopped watching TV news or
reading newspapers, other than a newsiet-
ter on his beloved Dallas Cowboys.
He and his wife, Virginia, moved last
year from a close1n Washington suburb to
a semirural part of Fairfax County, Va.,
an hour's drive from the capital. Justice
Thomas likes to boast that you can't even
see his new -home from the road. He
likewise.relishes the isolation that is possi-
ble at the Supreme Court, Where he can
avoid TV cameras and reporters. "I want
to get my anonymity back," he said at a
press reception in December 1991, and
has since refused all interview requests.
Showing 'They' Were Wrong
On the job, the former federal appeals
court judge'has made a conscious effort to
prove that he is more than the marginally
qualified, token black Republikin por-
trayed by his liberal antagonists. "People
asked, 'Is he qualified?' " recalls Arm-
strong Williams, another friend. "All these
liberal groups said no. lie felt he had to
show they were wrong."
le has answered in part with sheer
volume. In his first term, Justice Thomas
wrote 22 opinions, often writing separately
even when in the mijority. By contrast, his
fellow Bush appointee, David Souter, wrote
12 in his rookie year.
Although largely silent during oral ar-
gutihents, Justice Thomas is assertive on
paper, pushing his philosophy that the
high court's job is to interpret the Consti-
tution, not to legislate. In his view, tihe
federal judiciary has no constitutional role
second-guessing elected state officials
who, for example, want to restrict abor-
tions or impose capital punishment.. "He
wants to remove himself and remove other
federal judges from these intense de-
bates," says one of his former law clerks.
A Loyal Ally
Justice Thomas has become the most
loyal ally of Justice Antonin Scalia, a
brilliant but divisive force on the court's
right wing, who rarely tries to accommno-
date the views of other justices and who,
like.Justice Thomas, often writes separate
opinions when in the majority.
Justices Thomas and Scalia voted to-
gether 87% of the time last term, and the
pattern is continuing this term. Last week,
they were the only two justices to assert
that federal judges almost never should
hear special appeals by death-row inmates
if the prisoners have had an adequate
chance to make their constitutional argu-
ments in state courts. The Thomas-Scalia
rationale was that federal judges have no
"higher or more respected role than state
courts in applying Ithei 'Law of the
Land.' "
Sometimes joined by Chief Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist, Justices Scalia and Tho-
imas attack their colleagues for declining to
overrule liberal precedents protecting indi-
vidual rights.
In conservative legal circles, it is noted
caustically that when justices such as
Anthony Kennedy and Sandra Day O'Con-
nor moved fromi Ihe right toward the
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en icr. media pundits described tihem as
growing" or -evolving." Justice Thomas
sometimes entertains current and formier
law clerks by declaring, "I ain't evolving!"
followed by his trademark booming
laugh.
Spoofing legalese employed by the late
liberal Justice William Douglas to discover
the right to privacy in the "penumbras"
surrounding constitutional provisions,
Justice Thomas keeps a sign in his cham-
bers that requests: "Please Don't Emanate
in the Penumbras."
Justice Thomas has surrounded him-
self with the most conservative group of
clerks at the high court, and the unvar-
nished rhetoric of their drafts gives his
opinions a blunt tone. Michael Gerhardt, a
liberal law- professor at the College of
William and Mary in Virginia, finds Jus-
tice Thomas "more doctrinaire than any-
one else on the court, other than Scalia."
But lie adds. "His opinions strike me as
competent . . . He is within the legal
mainstream, if on the right edge."
A conservative legal scholar, Douglas
Kmiec at Notre Dame University, says
Justice Thomas's opinions show that "lie
has a tendency to think ahead and to
prefer analytical orderliness. rather than
clever distinctions from past cases."
Justice Thomas joined a Scalia-led
majority in January that said women
couldn't use a civil-rights conspiracy stat-
ute to seek federal court orders blocking
militant protests at abortion clinics. Jus- !
tice Thomas agreed with the reasoning
that the statute was written to protect
blacks against intimidation under .im
Crow laws. not to protect women seeking
abortions.
A Voice on Race
.Justice Thomas has expressed pride to
friends about adding a distinctive voice
aid presence on racial issues at (he court,
raising questions about the legacy of the
civil-rights movement that his white col-
leagues hesitate to confront. Last June, for
example, lie wrote a separate opinion in
the courCs decision requiring Mississippi
to move further to desegregate its public
colleges. The seemingly inevitable conse-
quence of the ruling was that the state
would close some of its struggling histori-
cally black schools whose programs dupli-
cated those at better-financed while
schools. The result would be integration.
But Justice Thomas,.isistedUat..oo
much forced integration would destroy
institutions that helped many blacks move
up in life. He quoted W.E.B. Du Bois, the
turn-of-the-century champion of black ad-
vancement: "We must rally to the defense
of our schools."
His role in this regard goes beyond
formal opinions. Although lie craves seclu-
sion, lie often plays host to visiting stu-
dents, especially from inner-city neighbor-
hoods.
One day recently, Mr. Bolick, a Wash-
ington lawyer, brought one of his clients, a
poor black -man from Detroit. to meet
Justice Thomas. "Clarence put his arm
around this guy, showed him around
the court, and before long they were
sharing stories of growing up poor," (h
lawyer recounts. It's hard to i magine any
of the other justices in this scene.
Like the man lie replaced. civil-rights
giant Thurgood Marshall. Justice Thomas
believes that his white colleagues often
don't understand the reality of race rela-
tions. But Justice Thomas's reality is typi-
cally the opposite of his predecessor's.
The late Justice Marshall unsuccess-
fully opposed the death penalty. in part
because lie believed its application was
infected with racism. justice Thomas not
only favors the death penalty but sug-
gested in a solo opinion inJanuary that it is
more fair to have mandatory death stat-
utes for certain crimes - even though the
court ruled in 1976 that mandatory capital
punishment is unconstitutional.
A Taste for Dissent
Finding himself at odds with the major-
ity in cases in which he is espousing a
deeply held principle doesn't bother Jus-
tice Thomas, people close to him say. "lie
revels in dissenting," says Mr. Bolick, who
helps run the Institute for Justice. a con-
servative advocacy group in Washington.
"He is actually less confident when lie is
part of a majority."
Months before Anita Hill surfaced pub-
licly in October 1991, President Bush had
put then-Judge Thomas in an awkward
position by making the dubious claim that
lie was the most qualified person for the
high court. Judge Thomas compounded the
problem by following the instructions of
his administration handlers to stonewall
any controversial legal questions. That
made him seem evasive and exacerbated
concerns about his legal acumen.
Friends report that, in retrospect, Ius-
tice Thomas regrets following the White
House playbook. When the sex-harassment
charges were leveled, he fired his handlers
and mounted an enraged and ultimately
.successful counterattack on the Judiciary
Committee and the liberal activists who
urged Ms. Hill to come forward.
Cloud Over the Court
Tie lurid televised testimony caused
great unease among some justices. They
feared the controversy would cast a cloud
over the Supreme Court. Just days after
the hearings concluded, Justice Harry
Blackmun said in a speech in Columbus,
Ohio. "I think the court has been damaged
by the events of the last few weeks. as all of
its have been damaged." lie added hope-
fully. "But perhaps we'll survive."
Despite the strained circumstances.
Justice Thomas was received cordially by
his new colleagues. But there is an under-
current of tension between him and Justice
O'Connor. people familiar with the work-
ings of the court say. although it has
surfaced publicly only in tie justices'
opinions.
Justice Thomas has come to agree
with Justice Scalia's view, shared with
conservative clerks and others, that jurists
who seek compromise. rather than the
single "right" answer in a case. are "poli-
ticians" masquerading in black robes.
Justice O*Connor. a proponent of split-
ting differences and moving cautiously.
gets tagged with this pejorative most often
in private conversation at the high court.
She, in turn, has accused Justice
Thomas in her opinions of misconstruing
high court precedent in his hurry to re-
make constitutional law.
Clash of Opinions
In one case last term. Justice Thomas
filed a dissent signed only by Justice Scalia
objecting to a ruling that said official
beatings of prison inmates violate the
Constitution even if guards don't inflict
serious injury. Thrashing inmates is de-
plorable. Justice Thomas said. but punish-
meient is not "cruel and unusual" unless
substantiial harm is done.
In her majority olpinion. .ustice O'Con-
nor wrote that "to deny. as the dissent
does. the difference between punching a
prisoner in the face and serving him
unappetizing food is to ignore the concepts
of dignity. civilized standards, humanity,
and decency that animate the Eighth
Amendment."
Typically direct, Justice Thomas's dis-
sent dismissed the majority view as "yet
another manifestation of the pervasive
view that- the federal Constitution must
address all ills in our society.'
Mandatory Executions
A 5-4 death-penalty ruling the high
court issued early this year provides a
snapshot of Justice Thomas's idiosyncratic
approach to controversial issues. Justice
Thomas joined Chief Justice Rehnquist
and .lustices White, Scalia and Kennedy in
rejecting the appeal of a convicted Texas
murderer who claimed the jury hadn't
fully considered evidence of his troubled
upbringing and redeeming character traits
when it sentenced him to die. Dissenting
were Justices Souter. O'Connor. Stevens
and Blackmun.
The majority, in an opinion written by
.Justice White, decided the case on narrow
procedural grounds; but Justice Thomas
wanted to go much further. In a separate
23-page opinion-six pages longer than the
majority's - he disparaged two decades'
worth of high court precedent on capital
punishment and made his case for manda-
tory death-penalty laws.
He argued that by requiring that juries
be given broad discretion to show mercy in
murder cases. the Supreme Court inadver-
tently had created opportunities for white
jurors to go easy on white defendants. "To
withhold the death penalty out of sympa-
thy for a defendant who is a member of a
favored group is no different from a deci-
sion to impose the penalty on the basis of
negative bias," Justice Thomas wrote.
One of Justice Thomas's former law
clerks explains that the justice "doesn't
see Ideath penaltyl cases as posing life-or--
death questions for hin; those are ques-
(ions properly answered by juries, not
federal judges."
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At the core of Ruth Bader Ginsburg's legal
writings, beneath the academic references, lofty terms
and excruciating attention to precedent, is a recurring
interest in real-life problems.
From her essays on abortion law, where she
addressed "the situation of women in society," to her
court opinion in an "Abscam" entrapment case, when
she was put off by an overzealous undercover
operation, Ginsburg examines the conditions that
bring people to a courthouse.
Her writings are filled with references to human
vulnerabilities: poverty to politics. They reflect the
experiences of a 60-year-old woman - wife, mother
and jurist - who constantly fought the odds herself.
[Related story, Page A15.]
Just as she did as a lawyer arguing key cases for
sexual equality, Ginsburg, a federal appeals judge
since 1980, scrutinizes the stereotypes that cause
harm. She pursues the motives of lawmakers and how
much power regulatory agencies need to do their job.
And overall, she looks at how average people
might be affected by a ruling. When broadcasters
challenged government limits on "indecent" TV
programs, Ginsburg said parents may indeed find
social value in some "indecent" works, citing those of
comic George Carlin and English novelist D.H.
Lawrence.
But Ginsburg will not always act on what she sees.
A broad, liberal vision of the world does not
materialize in the bottom-line judgment of her
opinions.
Ginsburg, whose Supreme Court confirmation
hearings begin today, has been guided in more than
300 opinions and dozens of law review and journal
articles by a historic notion -- that the court should
not be a lightning rod for social change.
Once considered a political liberal, she has taken
a moderate - even conservative - approach to
judging, following the letter of the law and leaving
policy choices to legislators. On many D.C. Circuit
rulings, she joined Republican-appointed judges,
rather than sign on with her Democratic-named
colleagues. And to the consternation of feminists, she
has questioned the legal underpinnings of the
controversial 1973 Supreme Court decision that made
abortion legal nationwide. Her views on the Roe v.
Wade decision are likely to generate much discussion
as she appears before the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
In her rulings, Ginsburg often has written that she
and her lower court colleagues are "impelled,"
"constrained," "required," to strictly follow high
court and circuit precedents. So, despite misgivings,
she voted to reinstate an Abscam conviction and
upheld an arguably vague government definition of
indecency.
When the two distinctive strands of Ginsburg's
work are considered together, the overriding question
is whether an appointment to the high court will make
her feel less the clutch of precedent and inspire her to
take the court beyond where it has been before to
solve societal problems.
"She is bound to bring to the court, along with her
craftsmanship, a degree of passion - even though it
is not common to identify that with her," said
Harvard University Law Professor Laurence H.
Tribe. "The rules of the game for an appeals court
judge and for a Supreme Court justice are quite
different."
Ginsburg herself has said appeals courtjudges must
follow, "if not marching instructions, then at least
some pathmarkers" from other circuits and the
Supreme Court.
She also sees a limited role for the Supreme Court.
As she explained in a March speech criticizing the
sweep of the court's Roe v. Wade decision,
"Measured motions seem to me right, in the main,
for constitutional as well as common law
adjudication."
Among the Ginsburg votes that trouble liberals are
those to dismiss a homosexual sailor's challenge to
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his Navy discharge (based on an earlier Supreme
Court order in a little-noted case) and to uphold the
drug search of a train passenger's belongings
although the man had withdrawn his consent to the
police search.
She also rejected a District law giving preference
for minority contractors, saying that while such
"set-aside" programs do not automatically violate
equal protection guarantees for white contractors, the
programs must be narrowly focused and justified by
evidence of past discrimination.
Ginsburg's style, while defying most comparisons
with Supreme Court justices, recalls some of Sandra
Day O'Connor's opinions. The court's first and only
female justice (named by Ronald Reagan in 1981) has
often considered how a legal ruling will upset or help
American life.
Some of Ginsburg's former law clerks believe that
Ginsburg would remain a cautious jurist. But others
close to her say that the former director of the
ACLU's Women's Rights Project will discover as a
justice a new freedom to act on liberal inclinations
and to fill gaps left by legislatures in the law.
Ginsburg herself has written that, "the [Supreme]
Court generally follows, it does not lead, changes
taking place elsewhere in society. But without taking
giant strides and thereby risking a backlash, the
court, through constitutional adjudication can
moderately accelerate the pace of change."
Husband Ran Interference With Balking
Republicans
Ginsburg's ability to straddle extremes helped win
her the seat on the D.C. Court of Appeals, as well as
the Supreme Court nomination.
When President Jimmy Carter announced his
selection of Ginsburg in December 1979, he faced a
tough primary campaign against Sen. Edward M.
Kennedy (D-Mass.). Choosing Ginsburg, then
considered one of the nation's leading feminists, was
expected to increase Carter's favor among women's
rights groups and other liberal constituencies naturally
gravitating toward Kennedy.
Six months later, in June 1980, Senate Republicans
were stalling judicial nominations, as all partisans are
wont to do in election years, and conservatives had to
be persuaded to let Ginsburg pass. Her husband,
Martin D. Ginsburg, a well-known tax lawyer,
worked behind the scenes to convince key GOP
senators that his wife would be a even-handed jurist.
(He also took the lead this year to generate letters
urging the White House to nominate his wife to the
high court.)
When President Clinton nominated Ginsburg on
June 14 after several changes of heart, it capped the
longest high-court search in modern times. Clinton
touted Ginsburg as someone who could act as a
"healer" and bring consensus to the court.
He also spoke of her regard for "the outsider in
society" and her own nontraditional life and
approach.
Of all of Ginsburg's writings, her most
unconventional work to date, on abortion rights, can
be read as typical of the dueling themes in her work,
her attention to both the plight of individuals and the
constraints of judging.
It takes into account the everyday experiences of
women who would want to end their pregnancies, as
well as people who oppose abortion. And it stresses
judicial restraint and deference to elected officials.
Ginsburg's point, first made in an April 1984
speech at the University of North Carolina, is that the
court of 1973 "ventured too far in the change it
ordered."
The Texas law challenged in the Roe case made
abortion a crime unless a physician determined that
the procedure was necessary to save the mother's
life. The court, by a 7 to 2 vote, struck down the
law, finding "a fundamental right to abortion" in the
concept of personal liberty or autonomy, arising from
the 14th Amendment's due process guarantee.
The ruling set out guidelines for permissible state
abortion regulation, tied to the phases of pregnancy
(trimesters) and the viability of the fetus, that is,
when it could survive outside the mother's body. The
court gave a woman's physician a large role in
determining whether an abortion would be performed.
As she has expressed many times, Ginsburg
believes that the justices, by concentrating on due
process and an idea of "medically approved
autonomy," rather than relying on an equal protection
guarantee against sex discrimination, failed to
completely justify legalizing abortion. They also
overplayed the role of a physician and effectively
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undersold women, she has argued.
Ginsburg, who supports abortion rights, said in the
1984 speech that, "The sweep and detail of the
opinion stimulated the mobilization of a right-to-life
movement and an attendant reaction in Congress and
state legislatures. In place of the trend 'toward
liberalization of abortion statutes' noted in Roe,
legislatures adopted measures aimed at minimizing
the impact of the 1973 rulings, including notification
and consent requirements, prescriptions for the
protection of fetal life, and bans on public
expenditures for poor women's abortions."
Ginsburg suggested that the court should have
outlawed only extreme laws, such as the Texas
statute. She said - and it has since been hotly
contested - that state lawmakers across the country
were themselves moving to legalized abortion. On the
Supreme Court's highly technical analysis of the
phases of pregnancy, she quoted Justice O'Connor's
sentiment that the trimester approach is "on a
collision course with itself," because of advances in
medical technology.
Ginsburg also argued that if the court had hinged
its ruling on "a woman's equality aspect, not simply
a patient-physician autonomy," the Supreme Court
might not have gone on in later years to reject a
constitutional obligation for government to pay for
poor women's abortions.
The justification for abortion that Ginsburg
proposed - based on sex discrimination - derives
from her success in the 1970s as the architect of
challenges to laws that determined separate
compensation on such benefits as Social Security by
whether the applicant was a man or woman. Through
her advocacy as an ACLU lawyer, the Supreme
Court extended the constitutional guarantee of "equal
protection" of the law to women. Until 1971, equal
protection guarantees only barred race-based
discrimination.
Her cases, for example, led to court rejection of
laws giving men preference over women in the
administration of estates, awarding military fringe
benefits to men's spouses that were denied to
women's spouses and giving widowed mothers Social
Security benefits a widowed father would be denied.
Such landmark rulings were not "activist,"
Ginsburg has said, because they "largely trailed and
mirrored changing patterns in society - most
conspicuously, the emergence of the two-career
Her focus in the Roe speeches, which had led
some feminists to discourage the White House from
considering Ginsburg, is judicial moderation. Yet,
because they are laden with references to what she
saw happening in the early 1970s, they offer a
window into what catches Ginsburg's attention. In the
North Carolina talk, since published in a 1985 law
review, she said when she was giving public speeches
on general sex discrimination issues (she did not
handle abortion litigation), "the most heated
questions" she got concerned abortion:
"The questions were pressed by black men. The
suggestion, not thinly veiled, was that legislative
reform and litigation regarding abortion might have
less to do with individual autonomy or discrimination
against women than with restricting population
growth among oppressed minorities."
One University of North Carolina law professor
who heard Ginsburg in the 1984 Chapel Hill speech
said recently she was struck by "the open mind"
Ginsburg brought to an issue that was
overwhelmingly emotional and politicized.
"I expected her to be more passionately an
advocate for a certain point of view, but she
embodied judicial restraint even outside the judicial
forum," Prof. Caroline N. Brown said.
Issues Advocates Describe Record of Rulings as
Mixed
"Restraint" has been Ginsburg's mantra on the
appeals court. After 13 years, she has amassed a
remarkably middle-of-the-road record, from business
disputes, to government regulation, to civil rights.
She has inspired neither consistent praise nor wrath
from advocates on a range of fractious issues.
"We have found no bombshells and it looks like
we'll be endorsing her," said Stephen A. Bokat, vice
president of the generally conservative U.S. Chamber
of Commerce. Similarly, the liberal-leaning People
for the American Way found Ginsburg's record
"mixed" yet "favorable on issues ranging from
freedom of expression and religion to sex
discrimination and civil rights."
The retired Justice Byron R. White, whom
Ginsburg would succeed, was often a swing vote on
the court himself. But White's overall approach
appears more conservative than Ginsburg's. In the
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family."
First Amendment area, for example, Ginsburg
already has shown a tendency to be more lenient than
White on religious rights and free speech in the face
of government restrictions.
In the 1984 Goldman v. Secretary of Defense,
which President Clinton specifically noted when
nominating her, Ginsburg defended the right of an
Air Force officer to wear a yarmulke while on duty.
In dissenting from a court majority's dismissal of the
officer's case, she said the prohibition of the
yarmulke suggests "callous indifference" to the
officer's religious faith and "it runs counter to 'the
best of our traditions' to accommodate ... spiritual
needs [of our people]."
Citing the First Amendment, as well as Third
World poverty, Ginsburg dissented in 1989 from a
majority ruling in DKT Memorial Foundation v.
Agency for International Development. The majority
threw out a challenge to a U.S. restriction on funds
to foreign abortion-related family planning services.
"I conclude that the Agency for International
Development (AID) has unconstitutionally deployed
its puissant purse to restrain the privately-funded
speech and association of" domestic organizations
engaged in family planning work overseas. She said
the regulation was "strikingly overbroad" and affected
activities in countries where abortion is legal and
"where abortion-related services are regarded as a
necessary last resort given current conditions of
poverty, ignorance, physical insecurity, and fear in
which many women live."
In the 1988 Action for Children's Television v.
Federal Communications Commission, while
upholding regulation of "indecent" programing, she
ordered the FCC to consider expanding its limited
midnight-to-6 a.m. timeslot for such fare.
Ginsburg also tends to be more liberal than White
in allowing people their day in court, what is known
as "legal standing." And Ginsburg appears to allow
regulatory agencies less deference in their
interpretation of federal law, for example, as when
she rejected in a 1982 case the Environmental
Protection Agency's lowering of air pollution
standards. (Her opinion was later overruled by the
Supreme Court, with White in the majority.)
Because the D.C. Circuit is dominated by
regulatory disputes, Ginsburg has spent much time
thinking and writing about how government works.
She is interested in the "dialogue" among the three
branches and asserts that the courts and Congress
should pay more attention to each other's work.
Singing a familiar tune among judges, she has
criticized "the failure of Congress to review and
revise statutes that slip from the judges' grasp."
Justice Antonin Scalia discourages courts that
cannot figure out what Congress meant in a statute
from looking to committee reports, floor speeches
and other components of legislative history. He
dismisses them as the work of staff or of a mere
handful of members.
Ginsburg referred approvingly to Scalia, her
friend, in a 1986 case, saying herself, "We think it
plainly wrong as a general matter . . . to regard
committee reports as drafted more meticulously and
as reflecting the congressional will more accurately
than the statutory text itself."
But it is clear from Ginsburg's opinions that she
does not share Scalia's disdain for legislative history;
her opinions are replete with numerous references to
lawmakers' proceedings before a bill became law.
One of Ginsburg's most important court rulings on
the interaction among the branches arose from a
post-Watergate law allowing for the appointment of
an independent counsel to pursue wrongdoing by
high-ranking executive branch officials. Ginsburg
dissented in 1988 from the majority's finding that the
law breached the constitutional separation of powers.
(The Supreme Court, in a case known as Morrison v.
Olson, later reversed the appeals court and agreed
with Ginsburg.)
She said, "The [law] is rooted in the principle that
'no man can be a prosecutor or judge in his own
case.' It is similarly unreasonable to expect an
individual to investigate or prosecute his superiors. .
. . The act . . . implements a fundamental control
essential to . . . the control of mutual checks. It is a
measure faithful to the eighteenth century blueprint,
yet fitting for our time."
Her dissenting opinion refused to accept a
"formalistic" or "rigid" view of the powers of the
three branches. Although she acknowledged that the
law required some relinquishing of the executive
branch's prosecutorial power, she said it had been
written to head off "abuses of Executive Branch
power, abuses which themselves threatened the
balance among the three branches of government."
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Her response in the 1983 Abscam case, United
States v. Kelly, arising out of FBI agents posing as
wealthy Arab businessmen, took a more standard
approach: "[Were the slate clear, we might . . .
perhaps ask whether, in real-world circumstances, the
person snared would even encounter bait as alluring
as the offer the government tendered." Instead, she
bowed to prior opinions giving the government great
leeway and voted to reinstate the bribery conviction
against former representative Richard Kelly, a
Republican from Florida.
In a 1987 case, limiting attorneys' fees under a
federal mining and land reclamation law, she said
that although she had misgivings, she did not want
"an end run around" precedent. That's what she
accused the dissenting judge of trying in Save Our
Cumberland Mountains v. Hodel.
Ginsburg is straightforward and serious, in person
as well as on paper. She can cut lawyers who appear
before her to ribbons with her sharp questions.
Law clerks who have drafted her opinions say she
is a brutal editor who wants to make sure her writing
carries her own voice. It is rare that a bit of dry
humor sneaks into her writing. But in a 1987 case
involving airline liability, In re Korean Air Lines
Disaster, she began her opinion, "This case arises out
of an air disaster and raises turbulent federal
questions."
All told, Ginsburg's body of work, against the
backdrop of her pathbreaking advocacy for women's
rights, leaves members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee with many questions about the kind of
justice she would make.
Fittingly, Ginsburg has addressed in a law review
article the scope of confirmation questions.
In a 1988 article after Supreme Court nominee
Robert H. Bork was defeated by the Senate, she
asked provocatively whether a nominee should have
to answer, "Do parents have any rights with respect
to abortions performed on their minor children?" As
is her style, she never answered the question for
herself. But she suggested that the era following the
Senate defeat of Bork's candidacy teaches that a
nominee is better off saying as little as possible.
As to whether the Senate should have the same
right to scrutinize a nominee's judicial philosophy as
the president, Ginsburg said:
"I agree with those who hold that sauce for the
goose must serve for the gander as well.. .. Judicial
confirmation is the extraordinary moment in which
the three branches of government intersect."
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IN IER OWN WORDS
Compiled by JOAN BISKUPIC
July 20, 1993
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Since her nomination to the Supreme Court on
June 14, Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg's criticism of
the breadth of Roe v. Wade, which made abortion
legal nationwide, has been widely circulated. But
Ginsburg - who has spent the last 13 years on the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and who faces
confirmation hearings scheduled to begin today - has
written on other controversial issues as well. Her
court opinions and scholarly writings generally
confirm her reputation as a moderate jurist. The
following are excerpts from some of Ginsburg's
writings. Citations are omitted.
"Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 1984: Right of
officer to wear a yarmulke.
"Dronenburg v. Zech, 1984: Navy's discharge of
homosexual sailor.
"Wright v. Regan, 1981: Federal tax breaks for
private, allegedly discriminatory schools.
"O'Donnell Construction Co. v. District of
Columbia, 1992: Minority "set-asides."
"DKT Memorial Foundation v. Agency for
International Development, 1989: U.S. restrictions on
funds to foreign abortion-related family planning
services.
"In Re Sealed Cases, 1988: Legality of
independent counsel law.
"Doe v. Dominion Bank of Washington, 1992:
Rape victim's right to sue landlord of building.
Free Exercise of Religion
In the 1984 case Goldman v. Secretary of Defense,
Ginsburg defended the right of an Air Force officer
to wear a yarmulke while on duty and dissented from
the court's refusal to hear his case.
The plaintiff in this case, S. Simcha Goldman, has
long served his country as an Air Force officer with
honor and devotion. A military commander has now
declared intolerable the yarmulke Dr. Goldman has
worn without incident throughout his several years of
military service. At the least, the declaration suggests
"callous indifference" to Dr. Goldman's religious
faith, and it runs counter to "the best of our
traditions" to accommodate [the public service to the]
spiritual needs [of our people]. . . . I believe the
court en banc should measure the command suddenly
and lately championed by the military against the
restraint imposed even on an armed forces
commander by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.
Gays in the Military
A homosexual sailor challenged his Navy discharge
in the 1984 case of Dronenburg v. Zech. A court
majority dismissed the sailor's claim. Ginsburg
agreed that the case should be dismissed but wrote
separately to note that her decision was based on a
Supreme Court order upholding a Virginia
anti-sodomy law and to separate herself from other
writings by the majority panel's conservative judges
and dissenting liberal judges.
In challenging his discharge for engaging in
homosexual acts in a Navy barracks, appellant argued
that the conduct in question falls within the zone of
constitutionally protected privacy. The panel held
that, either because of the binding effect of the
Supreme Court's summary of affirmance in Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney, or on the basis of
principles set forth in other Supreme Court decisions,
the Navy's determination could not be overturned. I
agree with the first basis of that holding.
It is true that, in its discussion of the alternative
basis, the [majority] panel opinion airs a good deal
more than disposition of the appeal required. . . .
The dissenting opinion bends "judicial restraint" out
of shape....
Civil Rights
In the 1981 case of Wright v. Regan, Ginsburg
wrote a majority opinion reinstating a race
discrimination case brought by African-American
parents who challenged federal tax breaks for private
schools. She said the parents had legal "standing" to
challenge the tax benefits, which perpetuated race
discrimination in their communities.
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* . [The Constitution does not permit the state to
aid discrimination even when there is no precise
causal relationship between state financial aid to a
private school and the continued well-being of that
school. A state may not grant the type of tangible aid
here involved if that aid has a significant tendency to
facilitate, reinforce, and support private
discrimination.
. .. We turn to the case as appellants have drawn
it, a case against a government agency alleged to
furnish economic benefits to racially discriminatory
local educational institutions. We believe that, should
appellants succeed on the merits, the remedial
problem can be handled without large-scale judicial
intervention in the administrative process. This case
does not involve any arcane question of tax law; its
sensible adjudication requires no entanglement with
complex, technical, interrelated aspects of the Internal
Revenue Code and its administration. The district
court should not and need not become a "shadow
[C]ommissioner of Internal Revenue" or "the
administrator of a nationwide tax enforcement
program." Guided by its own experience and that of
other courts, the district court is equipped to accord
relief that does not "impose grave burdens" or
involve "unfathomable effort." The court may call for
the parties' participation in framing a manageable
decree and may reject proposals that, in their scope
or particularity, reach for more than is necessary to
provide effective relief.
Minority 'Set-Asides'
In the 1992 case of O'Donnell Construction Co. v.
District of Columbia, Ginsburg voted with a majority
against a District law requiring city agencies to set
aside 35 percent of the dollar volume of contracts for
local minority business enterprises. She referred in a
concurring opinion to the Supreme Court's 1989
ruling in Richmond v. Croson, which rejected a
Richmond minority-contractors program. The high
court said the program, which was not supported by
evidence of prior discrimination against minority
contractors, violated the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the laws.
The pathmarking Croson decision instructs that
where, as here, race classification is resorted to for
remedial purposes, measures must be narrowly
focused and supported by a strong factual predicate.
As [the majority] opinion ably demonstrates, the
Minority Contracting Act falls short on both counts,
and I therefore concur in the panel opinion. I do so
with the understanding, made clear by Croson, that
minority preference programs are not per se offensive
to equal protection principles, nor need they be
confined solely to the redress of state-sponsored
discrimination. Further, in his separation opinion in
Croson, Justice [John Paul] Stevens reasoned, and I
agree, that remedy for past wrong is not the exclusive
basis upon which racial classification may be
justified.
Funds for Abortion Counseling
In the 1989 case of DKT Memorial Foundation v.
Agency for International Development, Ginsburg
dissented from a majority ruling that threw out a
challenge to a U.S. restriction on funds to foreign
abortion-related family planning services. She said
the U.S. policy was unconstitutional.
I conclude that the Agency for International
Development (AID) has unconstitutionally deployed
its puissant purse to restrain the privately-funded
speech and association of domestic nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) engaged in family planning
work overseas. . . . Because AID respect for the
First Amendment rights of domestic grantees should
assure the relief all plaintiffs seek, I would pretermit
the question whether our government officers have
overstepped constitutional limitations on their
authority with respect to foreign NGOs, here
exemplified by plaintiffs Parivar Seva Sanstha (PSS),
an Indian nonprofit society and Population Services
Family Programmes, Ltd., a United Kingdom
charity.
... Strikingly overbroad, [the policy] encompasses
relations with NGOs in countries where abortion is
legal, where abortion-related services are regarded as
a necessary last resort given current conditions of
poverty, ignorance, physical insecurity, and fear in
which many women live. While a purpose to avoid
antagonizing foreign nations is not rationally served
by a gross approach, just such a purpose is advanced
by segregated accounts, as the framers of the Mexico
City Policy recognized when they stated: "[When]
dealing with nations which support abortion with
funds not provided by the United States Government,
the United States will contribute to such nations
through segregated accounts which cannot be used for
abortion."
Independent Counsel Law
The D.C. Court of Appeals in 1988 ruled
unconstitutional a post-Watergate law allowing for the
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appointment of an independent counsel to pursue
wrongdoing by high-ranking executive branch
officials (In re Sealed Case). Ginsburg dissented, and
the U.S. Supreme Court later reversed the D.C.
Appeals Court majority, saying the constitutional
separation of powers was not breached by the law.
The Supreme Court case was known as Morrison v.
Olson.
. . . The Ethics Act is designed to function as a
control against abuse of executive branch power. It
implements the checking aspect of the separated
powers. The independent counsel provisions of the
Act were developed in response to the Watergate era
abuses of executive branch powers, abuses which
themselves threatened the balance between the three
branches of government. The Act is rooted in the
principle that "no man can be a prosecutor or judge
in his own case." It is similarly unreasonable to
expect an individual to investigate or prosecute his
superiors.
. . . The Ethics in Government Act is a carefully
considered congressional journey into the sometimes
arcane realm of the separation of powers doctrine,
more particularly, into areas the framers left
undefined. The Act is designed to prevent Congress'
own appropriation of the functions it insulates from
executive supervision, and it implements a
fundamental control essential to our Constitution's
doctrine of separated powers: the control of mutual
checks. It is a measure faithful to the eighteenth
century blueprint, yet fitting for our time.
Landlord Liability in Rape Case
Last year's D.C. Circuit case of Doe v. Dominion
Bank of Washington focused more on local law.
Ginsburg wrote a majority opinion that allowed a
woman who was raped in a downtown District
building to sue the bank that was the building's
landlord. The woman claimed that the bank had a
duty to take reasonable measures to protect its tenants
and their employees and that the bank should have
foreseen the potential for criminal activity at the
building, which was partially vacant.
. . . The district court refused to consider the
unsecured condition of the premises as a proper
factor in the determination of foreseeability. That
refusal, in our estimation, missed the thrust of
evolving D.C. precedent. Furthermore, the lack of
evidence of prior crimes against persons in or around
the building, we hold, did not "fatally flaw" Doe's
case. Because we concluded that Doe presented
evidence sufficient to require submission of the
critical issue of foreseeability to a jury's verdict, we
reverse the judgment entered as a matter of law for
the Bank and remand the case for a full trial.
There was ample evidence here that the Bank had
incessant notice of criminal activity - including theft,
burglary, drug use, and possibly prostitution -
ongoing at [the location] during the two and a half
years preceding Doe's rape. The proof in fact
suggested that the office building itself was "high
crime" prone. In these circumstances, we are
satisfied that lack of specific evidence as to the
reputation of the surrounding area for criminal
activity is without dispositive significance.
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TOP COURT NOMINEE WAS CAUTIOUS ACTIVIST
JURIST'S DECISIONS 'CAN'T BE TYPED'
By LINDA P. CAMPBELL AND LINDA M. HARRINGTON
Copyright 1993 Chicago Tribune Company
Chicago Tribune
June 20, 1993, Sunday, FINAL EDITION
It was 1976 when a case called Craig vs. Boren
arrived at the U.S. Supreme Court. Two fraternity
brothers and the proprietor of an Oklahoma bar called
the Honk and Holler were asking the justices to
decide whether states could ban 18-year-old men but
not "girls" of the same age from buying near beer.
It looked like a trivial case, and the lawyers for the
parties made arguments that were sexist and
ponderous.
But Columbia University law professor Ruth Bader
Ginsburg filed a brief in the case on behalf of the
American Civil Liberties Union, arguing that laws
pigeonholing the sexes hurt both but ultimately treat
women as second-class citizens.
Largely because of Ginsburg's intervention, Craig
vs. Boren resulted in a landmark Supreme Court
ruling that strengthened constitutional protections
against sex discrimination by setting a new standard
for looking at laws that treat men and women
differently.
The court said for such laws to be upheld, they
must be substantially related to an important
government interest. That test did not treat women
the same as racial minorities, but it meant that a law
biased against women had to be more than reasonable
to be constitutional.
It was among a series of cases that Ginsburg, now
a federal appeals court judge and nominee for the
Supreme Court, used to redefine women's rights in
the 1970s.
But even as an activist, Ginsburg followed the
cautious, measured approach to attacking legal
problems that she has demonstrated during 13 years
on the federal bench.
Ginsburg won new elements of equality for women
step by step, not so much boldly as solidly.
Georgetown law professor David Cole has analyzed
her work and said she "chose to litigate issues that
she could frame as hurting both men and women," a
strategy that "limited her range and increased her
chances for success."
As a judge, Ginsburg has favored incremental
change in the law rather than broad revisions and
advocated a limited role for judges in partnership
with the other branches of government.
She has said that she tries to decide each case on
the facts and the law at hand, even if her decision
conflicts with "what the home crowd wants."
Although Ginsburg has been called a moderate or
centrist, "she can't be typed easily under any one
label," said Georgetown law professor Susan Deller
Ross. 'She tries to look at things with a fresh eye."
Most of the early reaction to Ginsburg has been
positive. Liberal interest groups like her because she
generally favors strong protections for free speech
and free exercise of religion. Pro-business groups see
her as even-handed, sometimes voting with
conservatives and sometimes with liberals on the
fractious federal appeals court for the District of
Columbia.
In the Ist Amendment area, she has:
- Written a 1988 opinion ordering the Federal
Communications Commission to reconsider its rule
restricting adult television programming containing
indecent material to the midnight to 6 a.m. time slot.
- Upheld a challenge to a Reagan administration
policy denying visas to certain foreign visitors
because of their political views.
- Dissented when the court in 1984 refused to
allow a Jewish military officer to wear a yarmulke
while on duty.
- Questioned a 1992 decision allowing the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to keep secret safety reports
given voluntarily to the agency by an industry group.
Her record on business issues includes joining
Judge Robert Bork in two 1986 antitrust opinions that
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critics, during hearings on his Supreme Court
nomination a year later, said did not apply the law
strictly enough.
However, she did dissent when the court in 1989
allowed the Justice Department to approve a joint
operating agreement for Detroit's two main
newspapers.
And last year she voted to strike down a District of
Columbia program setting aside 35 percent of city
construction contracts for minority-controlled firms
but wrote that minority-preference programs do not
always violate the Constitution.
In criminal cases Ginsburg has been criticized for
joining a ruling earlier this year that upheld the
cocaine conviction of a train passenger who claimed
police violated his rights by continuing to inspect his
belongings after he changed his mind about
consenting to the search.
However, in a separate 1993 case she voted to give
a new trial to a man convicted of cocaine possession,
ruling that the trial judge wrongly limited testimony
that might have helped him.
Despite the range of Ginsburg's experience,
questioning during her Senate Judiciary Committee
confirmation hearing is likely to focus on her views
about abortion.
For years, Ginsburg has maintained that Roe vs.
Wade, the 1973 ruling that declared abortion a
fundamental constitutional right and struck down most
of the nation's abortion laws, was too broadly
decided.
Although her argument long has been debated in
legal circles, Ginsburg nearly derailed her chances of
being nominated by reiterating her position in a
speech earlier this year. She said the court should
have outlawed only extreme laws like the Texas
statute in question and based its decision on
equal-protection guarantees rather than a right to
privacy.
"Doctrinal limbs too swiftly shaped, experience
teaches, may prove unstable," she said.
She said there are times for the court to "step
ahead of the political branches in pursuit of a
constitutional precept," as it did in outlawing racially
segregated schools in 1954.
But, she said, Roe vs. Wade "halted a political
process that was moving in a reform direction and
thereby, I believe, prolonged divisiveness and
deferred stable settlement of the issue."
Anti-abortion groups have denounced Ginsburg as
an extreme liberal who would favor abortion on
demand at taxpayer expense and whose approach
would remove any restrictions on the procedure.
They also point to her 1989 dissent from a ruling that
let the Bush administration refuse to fund
international family planning programs that counsel
on abortion.
On the other hand, the National Abortion Rights
Action League has said her criticisms of Roe are
"cause for concern" and called on senators to seek
clarification.
It is clear, however, that Ginsburg has a sense of
what rigors may lie ahead.
She made a detailed study of the history of the
confirmation process for. a 1988 lecture at the
University of Illinois College of Law in which she
criticized the "misinformation" campaigns that
brought down Bork's Supreme Court nomination and
led to the ouster of three judges from the California
Supreme Court in 1986.
She said that during her confirmation hearing for
the appeals court in 1980 she found it a "frightful
prospect" that senators might ask her such things as
"Do parents have any rights with respect to abortions
performed on their minor children?"
But she said her "view has shifted" since then.
Quoting a former Columbia colleague, she said, "The
Senate comes second but is not secondary" in the
appointment process. "The standards the Senate
should apply are the same as those that should govern
the president: What would serve the national interest
not simply for today's cases but for the long term."
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SENATE, 96-3, EASILY AFFIRMS JUDGE GINSBURG AS A JUSTICE
By LINDA GREENHOUSE, Special to The New York Times
Copyright 1993 The New York Times Company
The New York Times
August 4, 1993, Wednesday, Late Edition - Final
Ruth Bader Ginsburg easily won confirmation to
the Supreme Court today, and within hours of the
Senate vote Judge Ginsburg, who argued six cases
before the Justices as an advocate for women's
rights, returned to the Court to inspect her new
office.
Judge Ginsburg, who was on the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, will officially become Justice Ginsburg when
she takes the oath of office next Tuesday. She arrived
at the Court in midafternoon in a silver Nissan
Maxima driven by her husband, Martin. "It feels
wonderful, " she said of her confirmation as the car
paused briefly before disappearing into the Court's
underground garage.
The purpose of the visit was to discuss the
logistics of her impending move into chambers being
vacated by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Thomas
in turn will move into the chambers long occupied by
Justice Byron R. White, who retired in June and
whom Judge Ginsburg is succeeding.
Aside from a slight bustle caused by her visit, the
building was quiet today: the Court is in recess and
several of the Justices are out of town.
Flood of New Paperwork
Work is piling up for Judge Ginsburg. She must
familiarize herself with the 46 cases the Court has
scheduled for argument in the term that begins on
Oct. 4, as well as with the more than 1,000 new
appeals the Court will dispose of on that date. Judge
Ginsburg met with Francis J. Lorson, the chief
deputy clerk, to discuss how to handle the flood of
new paperwork.
She was confirmed this morning by a vote of 96 to
3. The only votes against her came from three
conservative Republicans: Jesse Helms of North
Carolina, Don Nickles of Oklahoma and Robert C.
Smith of New Hampshire. Senator Donald W. Riegle
Jr., a Michigan Democrat, did not appear for the
vote.
There was no debate on the Senate floor today.
During a brief debate on Monday, Senator Helms
said he had tentatively decided to vote in favor of
Judge Ginsburg until he reviewed her record over the
weekend. He contended that she supports the right to
abortion unreservedly, and "is likely to uphold the
homosexual agenda."
'Wise and Insightful' Choice
Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., Democrat of
Delaware, said Judge Ginsburg's nomination had
been "one of the real joys" of his tenure as chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which
unanimously endorsed the nomination last week. He
also said he hoped President Clinton would be "as
wise and insightful" in choosing any future Supreme
Court nominees.
Judge Ginsburg will be the second woman to sit on
the Supreme Court, after Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, who was named to the Court by President
Ronald Reagan in 1981, and is the first successful
nominee by a Democratic President since Lyndon B.
Johnson chose Thurgood Marshall in 1967.
She also will be the first Jewish Justice since Abe
Fortas resigned in 1969, and the first native New
Yorker to serve on the Court since Benjamin N.
Cardozo, who died in office in 1938.
Federal judges take two oaths of office: the
constitutional oath administered to all Federal
employees, and a special judicial oath. The tentative
schedule for Judge Ginsburg's swearing-in next week
calls for her to take the first oath at the White House
and the second in a private ceremony at the Court,
with a public celebration to be held in October after
the Court begins its new term.
After her Court visit, Judge Ginsburg went to the
White House for a Rose Garden appearance with Mr.
Clinton. Standing by her side in the 89-degree heat,
the President predicted that she would be "a great
Justice" who would "move the Court not left or right,
but forward."
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Inviting questions, Judge Ginsburg got this one:
"You've been called a liberal, you've been called a
conservative, you've been called a moderate. What
are you?"
Borrowing pointedly from the Gilbert and Sullivan
operetta "Iolanthe," she replied, to the apparent
confusion of the White House press corps, "I don't
believe that every child that's born alive is either a
little liberal or else a little conservative, except in
Gilbert and Sullivan."
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SARCASTIC JUSTICE PUT TART TOUCH ON CONSERVATISM
By: Lyle Denniston Washington Bureau
Baltimore Morning Sun - Saturday, March 20, 1993
For 31 years, Byron R. White has cast votes on
the Supreme Court that have proved, day after day,
that presidents should not expect anything in return
when they name a justice.
A brainy and crusty conservative put on the court
by one of history's most liberal presidents, John F.
Kennedy, Justice White has fit quite well -
comfortably, even - into the rightward turn of the
court over the past generation.
His streak of independence helped gain him a
reputation among some as a maverick, an
unpredictable justice. But as three decades passed,
and the court shifted from liberal to conservative,
Justice White could be found most of the time casting
his votes for conservative results.
This term and last, for example, the justice's
voting patterns have not differed markedly from
those of the court's most conservative members:
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.
Over the years, Justice White became the court's
most impatient interrogator of lawyers at the lectern,
growing bitingly sarcastic when he did not get
immediate responses. Just last month, his voice
dripping with disdain, he told one lawyer, "I think
you're just not answering the question, and I don't
want to waste your time by insisting that you do, so
go right ahead."
Known around the courthouse for his almost
practiced grumpiness, Justice White once called the
court's police to his chambers when a court aide
whom he knew, finding no one in the justice's outer
offices, stuck his head into the main suite where
Justice White was working alone.
A tart-tongued conversationalist, Justice White also
did not hold back in public ceremony. He went to the
White House to swear in Justice Thomas, only to
lecture the White House and the new justice about
holding the ceremony while the court was in
mourning for the chief justice's wife.
Never overcoming his deep resentment when
journalists insisted upon referring to him by his
college football nickname, "Whizzer," Justice White
once told a friend who had informed him of the news
media's unhappiness over a series of negative
Supreme Court rulings on their rights: "Well, the
bastards deserve it." Although he joined the famous
1964 decision that first gave the news media
constitutional protection in libel cases, he later said
that ruling was wrong.
He is the only member of the court who refuses
ever to describe the issues or the background of a
decision he has written, leaving the tourists in the
courtroom baffled as he recites only the name of the
case and the result: affirmed or reversed. He said
privately he thought it was a waste of time; he sits
with his head buried in his papers as other justices
tell about what they have written.
Although some scholars of the court have
suggested that Justice White never settled long
enough in any area of the law to allow himself to be
classified as anything but a pragmatist, his work
generally was a seldom-broken skein of conservatism,
even if not harshly ideological.
When he did support liberal outcomes, from time
to time over the years, the cases usually involved
questions of race equality. But it was Justice White
who wrote a sweeping decision, in 1976, that made
it considerably more difficult to win race bias cases
that had been filed under the Constitution's guarantee
of equality.
The Constitution, the White opinion declared,
outlaws only intentional acts of race bias, not acts
that, in practical operation, have the effect of putting
minorities at a disadvantage.
A justice's dissenting votes and remarks often say
much about that judge's basic approach to the law,
and that was true of Justice White's most
conspicuous and most important dissents: in 1966, in
the case first requiring police to give "Miranda
warnings" to suspects they are holding, and in 1973,
when the court first established a woman's
constitutional right to abortion.
The "Miranda" decision, requiring a police
procedure that is now universally used by police --
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even officers in every TV police show arrest - led In 1982, a White opinion spoke for the court as it
Justice White in dissent to protest that "the court's freed the states to prosecute aggressively anyone
rule will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to involved in the preparation or distribution of child
the streets and to the environment which produced pornography; that decision was one of few in history
him, to repeat his crime whenever it pleases him." to create explicit exceptions to the First
Amendment's broad guarantees of free expression.
One of two dissenters in the abortion decision in
Roe vs. Wade, he complained: "As an exercise of
raw judicial power, the court perhaps has authority
to do what it does today; but in my view its judgment
is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the
power ofjudicial review that the Constitution extends
to this court."
He cast another dissent on abortion last June, when
the court by a 5-4 vote partly reaffirmed Roe vs.
Wade; he and the court's three most conservative
members voted to overrule Roe entirely.
In January, Justice White voted with a 5-4 majority
to bar the use of federal civil rights law to protect
abortion clinics from blockaders.
The justice wrote the 5-4 decision in 1985 that
essentially put a stop to the court's modem trend of
constantly expanding individual rights by finding
them within a broad "right of privacy." That was the
decision that rejected, mostly because of the nation's
history of revulsion at homosexuality, a claim that
gay adults should have a constitutional right to engage
in sexual conduct in private.
In no area of the court's work has Justice White
been a more predictable figure than in decisions of
recent years cutting back sharply on the rights of
criminal suspects, including death row inmates.
Justice White was the author of perhaps the most
significant grant of power in modem history to
police: the 1984 decision creating a sweeping
exception to a 70-year-old rule that automatically
barred from every criminal case any evidence that
police got by illegal methods - no matter how strong
that evidence was.
So long as officers got the evidence with a search
warrant and believed they were acting lawfully, it
made no difference that the warrant actually was
illegal, the court declared.
Justice White has been a consistent supporter of the
death penalty since the Supreme Court reinstated that
ultimate punishment in 1976. He voted, for example,
to allow the states to have a mandatory death penalty
for certain murders.
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MARSHALL WAS THE CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT
By AARON EPSTEIN; Knight-Ridder Tribune News
Copyright 1993 The Houston Chronicle Publishing Company
The Houston Chronicle
January 25, 1993, Monday, 2 STAR Edition
WASHINGTON - Everyone knew, when he said
goodbye to the Supreme Court in 1991, that
Thurgood Marshall had done more to transform the
lives of American blacks than anyone, except maybe
the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr
Marshall was the conscience of the court. He
never had forgotten - and never let his white,
colleagues forget - that he knew firsthand the cruel
sting of racism.
Despite the gains blacks had made under the law,
Marshall knew the struggle for equality was far from
over.
Were blacks ""free at last? " a reporter asked
Marshall that last day.
""Well, I'm not free," Marshall replied gruffly.
""All I know is that years ago, when I was a
youngster, a Pullman porter told me that he'd been in
every city in this country, he was sure, and he had
never been in any city in the United States where he
had to put his hands up in front of his face to find out
that he was a Negro. I agree with him. "
As a civil rights lawyer, Marshall had devised a
legal strategy to use the Constitution's dormant
promises as a sword to cut through one racial barrier
after another, culminating in the 1954 decision
outlawing segregation in public schools.
And for 24 years, Marshall the justice prodded his
high court colleagues to do the right thing.
When they didn't, he sometimes would thunder for
all to hear.
On his final day on a Supreme Court controlled by
Reagan and Bush conservatives, Marshall released a
bitter dissent that began: ""Power, not reason, is the
new currency of this court's decisions. " Inevitably,
he predicted, the conservatives would ""squander the
authority and the legitimacy of this court as a
protector of the powerless. "
If ever there was a protector of the powerless on
the Supreme Court, it was Thurgood Marshall.
He was the first justice to attack the deliberate
exclusion of blacks from juries in criminal
prosecutions of black defendants.
The use by prosecutors of such racially
discriminatory tactics was, Marshall warned in 1984,
""one of the gravest and most persistent problems
facing the American judiciary today. "
Two years later, in Batson vs. Kentucky, the court
did what Marshall had urged. It began the process of
outlawing the exclusion of minorities from juries for
racial reasons.
Marshall was often in the majority in the last years
of the liberal Warren Court in the 1960s and the
early Burger Court in the 1970s. But as
conservatives began arriving during the Reagan
administration, Marshall found himself increasingly
in the minority.
""One of the questions I asked prospective law
clerks was, "How do you like writing dissenting
opinions? ' And if they said no, they didn't get the
job," Marshall said.
He chided his colleagues publicly for deciding
cases without hearing from both sides and reviewing
the full lower court record.
While his conservative colleagues were trying to
speed up executions, Marshall remained unalterably
opposed to the death penalty in every instance. He
often explained his reasons with eloquence and
humanity.
The U.S. court system, he said, routinely allowed
defendants convicted of murder to be executed
without having had competent and experienced
lawyers at their trials or enough time to prepare
adequate appeals.
Two months before he retired, Marshall bristled
when the court amended its rules to allow dismissals
of ""frivolous or malicious" appeals by the poor. He
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wrote acidly:
""The court once had a great tradition: "All men
and women are entitled to their day in court. ' It will
now read: "All men and women are entitled to their
day in court only if they have the means and the
money. "'
He was a stalwart defender of affirmative action
plans that provided job and educational preferences
for minorities, reportedly telling his white colleagues:
""You guys have been practicing discrimination for
years. Now it is our turn. "
Marshall wrote an opinion upholding the
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, but when
the court found nothing unconstitutional about the
vast disparities in the financing of poor and affluent
public school districts, Marshall dissented.
""Personal poverty may entail much the same
social stigma as .. .certain racial or ethnic groups,"
he said.
In short, Marshall brought a unique perspective to
the court.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor called it ""the power
of moral truth. " ""He is a man who sees the world
exactly as it is and pushes on to make it what it can
become," O'Connor wrote recently. ""No one could
avoid being touched by his soul. "
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SECRETS OF THE HIGH COURT:
PAPERS AFFORD A RARE GLIMPSE OF JUSTICES' DELIBERATIONS
THE MARSHALL FILES, Part 1 of 3
By Benjamin Weiser, Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writers
The Washington Post
May 23, 1993
Newly available papers of the late Justice
Thurgood Marshall, including extensive internal files
on cases decided as recently as 1991, provide a rare
look at the confidential deliberations of the
contemporary Supreme Court.
The Marshall files, which were made public by the
Library of Congress after his death in January at age
84, contain private memos and drafts of decisions
that circulated among all the justices and reveal new
details on how the court - one of the government's
most secretive institutions -- handled such issues as
abortion, civil rights, free speech, crime and
government power.
Collectively, the papers show the court's
decision-making process as a continuing conversation
among nine distinct individuals on dozens of issues
simultaneously. The exchanges are serious,
sometimes scholarly, occasionally brash and
personalized, but generally well-reasoned and most
often cast in understated, genteel language.
The papers, which Marshall gave to the Library of
Congress after his 1991 retirement, consist of about
173,700 items from his career, mostly from his years
at the court. The collection would fill a wall of
bookshelves 8 feet high and nearly 30 feet long; the
Supreme Court files cover more than 3,000 cases.
Normally, the public sees only portions of the
court's process: a brief announcement that a case has
been accepted for a decision; written and oral
arguments; and, months later, the final ruling and
written opinions.
The Marshall papers provide a wealth of material
on the steps that are rarely seen: the private debate,
votes and jockeying among the justices over which
cases to take and reject; the preliminary votes at the
weekly justices-only conferences and the crucial
assignments of authors for the majority and dissenting
opinions.
Included are the handwritten tallies that Marshall
made of the justices' votes and whatever brief notes
he took on their discussion of which issues to address
or avoid.
The papers also show the draft-by-draft evolution
of the written opinions, as well as glimpses of the
critical negotiations as one of the justices maneuvers
to hold or forge a majority. "I shall do my best to
accommodate the criticism which seems to be
emanating from all directions," Justice John Paul
Stevens wrote to his colleagues as his majority
slipped away in a 1989 case.
The months-long internal debate on a case often
focuses on how much law to change or make.
Sometimes, cases come right down to the wire. In a
1989 decision that struck down laws prohibiting
flag-burning, Justice Harry A. Blackmun cast his
decisive fifth vote two days before the opinion was
issued. "I struggled with this difficult and distasteful
little (big?) case, but I join your opinion," Blackmun
wrote in a one-sentence memo to Justice William J.
Brennan Jr., the author of the majority opinion in the
5-4 decision.
In other cases, a majority of justices start down
one path, only to reverse direction. This happened in
a 1989 case that was a matter of life and death.
Initially, a majority of justices voted in conference to
overturn the murder conviction of Phillip D.
Tompkins, who was on death row in Texas. Justice
Stevens circulated a 28-page draft majority opinion,
saying that the systematic exclusion of blacks from
the jury may have denied Tompkins a fair trial.
Then, votes began to shift and Stevens himself
expressed uncertainty about some parts of his draft.
Three months and 31 memos and draft opinions later,
the justices discarded this work and upheld
Tompkins's conviction in a 10-word unsigned ruling.
Tompkins was spared execution when the governor of
Texas, citing reasons different from Stevens's draft
opinion, commuted his sentence to life in prison.
This is the kind of internal debate that the justices
have argued should remain confidential, taking the
position that only their final opinions have legal
authority. They have expressed concern that
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premature disclosure of their private debates and
doubts may undermine the court's credibility and
inhibit their exchange of ideas.
When Marshall donated his papers to the Library
of Congress in October 1991, he required researchers
to obtain his written permission for access, according
to his legal agreement with the library. "Thereafter,
the Collection shall be made available to the public at
the discretion of the Library," the agreement states.
Cecilia "Cissy" Marshall, the widow of the late
justice, issued a statement Friday through her
attorney: "My husband had great respect for the court
and its tradition of confidentiality. I am certain he
never intended his papers to be released during the
lifetime of the justices with whom he sat and I am
surprised that the Library of Congress has chosen to
release them at this time."
Other former Marshall associates said last week
that Marshall must have assumed that the library
would follow the practice of delaying public access
until Marshall's fellow justices were no longer
serving on the court. Jill Brett, a spokesman for
Librarian of Congress James H. Billington, said
yesterday that Billington and two library staff
members met at the Supreme Court Oct. 7, 1991,
with Marshall, who agreed to "access without
restriction upon his death."
In 1988, Marshall agreed to write an autobiography
with the assistance of journalist Carl T. Rowan. But
when Rowan wanted to focus on Marshall's years on
the court and its secrets, Marshall dropped out of the
project and returned the $ 100,000 advance that he
had received, one Marshall associate said. Rowan
went on alone to write a book about Marshall.
"It was very difficult for him because he did not
have much money," the associate said of Marshall's
decision to give back the advance, "but he was scared
to death about anyone tracing or attributing leaks or
[court] stories to him."
In recent times, no other justice's papers have
become available so soon after his departure from the
court. The papers of the late Justice William 0.
Douglas, who retired in 1975, did not become
available until 10 years later. Byron R. White, who
has announced his retirement, has specified that his
papers will not become freely available until 10 years
after his death.
Brennan, who retired in 1990, strictly limited
access to his papers when he gave them to the
Library of Congress. He tightened the restrictions
even further after several of his former colleagues
said they were worried about possible
"embarrassment," according to a Dec. 19, 1990,
memo that Brennan wrote to the justices, which is
contained in the Marshall papers.
Marshall's files almost did not make it to the
library at all. At one time, he apparently considered
destroying them. "Because we heard that you
intended to bum your valuable collection, we are
especially grateful that it will soon become [part] of
the holdings of the nation's library," Billington wrote
to Marshall on Oct. 21, 1991.
Washington Post reporters have examined several
dozen case files from the Marshall archive, paying
particular attention to recent controversial cases
involving abortion, civil rights and other
constitutional issues. The papers also contain
hundreds of memos on court administration and
protocol, including a glimpse of the justices' efforts
to keep the court untainted by politics.
For example, some justices expressed reservations
about swearing-in ceremonies for new colleagues held
at the White House, rather than at the court. In
October 1990, when the Bush administration arranged
a White House swearing-in for David H. Souter,
Stevens recalled his uneasiness about attending a
similar function for Reagan appointee Anthony M.
Kennedy in 1988. "1 know that on that occasion I had
serious misgivings about the possible separation of
powers implications of the President's use of the
occasion in a somewhat political way," Stevens wrote
to his colleagues.
The issue arose again after Bush named Clarence
Thomas to the court in 1991. Blackmun wrote in a
Sept. 19, 1991, memo to his colleagues, "The
practice of having an oath administered in the White
House lends further weight to the politicization of the
appointment process. It appears to have begun in the
years of the Reagan administration. . . . I refused to
attend the White House ceremony the last time, and
I shall not attend this time, if there is one."
The same day, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
offered his views in a memo: "I am quite confident
that the White House regards the oath-taking
ceremony as a very important photo-opportunity and
platform for the President, which it pursues without
a great deal of regard for the consequences
elsewhere."
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Justice Antonin Scalia floated the possibility of a
deal. If the president would forgo a White House
ceremony, he said in a memo, the court could invite
the president to a swearing-in at the court and
perhaps allow cameras for the first time so the
president could have a "photo-op."
But Scalia said this proposal carried a risk. "I
believe in the camel's nose," Scalia quipped in his
memo, referring to the difficulty of keeping the camel
out of the tent once it pokes its nose inside.
Scalia said he was willing to break precedent and
allow cameras inside the court for the occasion only
if "there is some offsetting benefit. I would consider
the elimination of the White House ceremony to be
such a benefit.... In order to make the arrangement
attractive to President Bush (and later Presidents) I
think we should allow minimally intrusive on-floor
cameras and even lights. The President's men are
going to want good theatre and attractive close-ups."
Rehnquist noted in response to Scalia: "It is
somewhat awkward to invite someone to your house
on the condition that he not invite you to his house."
In the end, the court decided against televising
Thomas's swearing-in after all nine justices weighed
in with separate memos to the chief justice. Most
offered a bit of explanation for opposition, but
Marshall was characteristically terse. "I vote to deny
the request to televise the investiture," his memo
said.
An Obsession With Detail
This kind of one-person, one-vote democracy
prevails in just about everything the justices do, at
least during the period when Marshall was on the
court. They take few actions without consulting each
other, soliciting written responses on everything from
increasing security at the court during the Persian
Gulf War to planning a traditional wine toast to
commemorate a justice's birthday.
This obsession with detail surfaces often in the
files. An April 1, 1991, memo from Rehnquist, for
example, proposed that an "assistant clerk for records
management" be given a new title of "deputy clerk"
to recognize the clerk's years of service. One by one,
each justice sent Rehnquist a separate memo
endorsing the change.
The documents show the justices to be meticulous
in their drafting of opinions. Sometimes they will
change a single word in a lengthy draft of an opinion
and send it to be completely reprinted and
redistributed to each justice. The new draft will
carefully list on the front of every page where the
slightest changes have been made, so no one will
miss them.
A ritual courtesy pervades their private
communications. The strong language that sometimes
appears in published opinions rarely shows up in the
memos they write to each other. "Dear Thurgood, I
think I will wait 'til the dust settles before voting on
this," Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote to
Marshall as he sought her support for an opinion in
a 1985 case.
They refer to each other by first names (Harry and
Sandra) or nicknames (Nino for Scalia, Tony for
Kennedy). The chief justice merits his own special
appellation: "Chief," or "CJ."
When responding to a draft they do not like, the
justices almost never say "no" outright. Instead, they
have developed their own distinct vocabulary. "I
await other writing in this case," means "I don't like
your opinion and I want to see what someone else has
to say." When they say "in due course," they mean,
"when I get around to it."
In their private writing, most of the justices come
across much as they do in public. Scalia is blunt,
witty and sometimes caustic. Brennan is strong-willed
but conciliatory, looking to build a consensus.
Stevens likes to weigh carefully all sides of an issue,
sometimes seeming indecisive, which Marshall notes
several times.
The papers do not tell everything about a case -
they reveal only what is written down - but they
offer a rare opportunity to learn more about how a
justice arrived at a controversial decision.
For example, the papers shed light on a
longstanding mystery: why Justice Lewis F. Powell
Jr. switched sides and voted to uphold a Georgia law
banning sodomy, changing the outcome of a 1986
case, Bowers v. Hardwick.
Powell explained his reasons in an April 8 internal
memo that he circulated to the other justices.
Originally, he wrote, he voted to strike down the
sodomy law because punishing someone for "a
private act of homosexual sodomy" might violate the
Constitution's Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and
unusual punishment.
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But no one had made the Eighth Amendment
argument to the court, he wrote, so it would be
inappropriate for him to address it.
Moreover, he said, he could not go along with the
argument - that a "fundamental substantive
constitutional right" existed "to engage in conduct
that for centuries has been recognized as deviant, and
not in the best interest of preserving humanity."
So, Powell said, "upon further study as to exactly
what is before us, I conclude that my 'bottom line'
should be to [uphold the law.]"
Exploring Issues in Print
At times, the justices explore subjects in their
memos that never make their way into published
opinion. In the landmark 1978 Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke case, where a
splintered 5-4 court decided that colleges could
consider an applicant's race as a factor in admissions,
Blackmun mused about the views that constitutional
scholar Alexander M. Bickel had offered in an earlier
case.
"And, of course, his position is - and I hope I
offend no one, for I do not mean to do so - the
'accepted' Jewish approach," Blackmun .wrote in a
May 1, 1978, memo.
"It is to be noted that nearly all the responsible
Jewish organizations who have filed amicus briefs
here are [on] one side of the case," he wrote. "They
understandably want 'pure' equality and are willing
to take their chances with it, knowing that they have
the inherent ability to excel and to live with it
successfully. Centuries of persecution and adversity
and discrimination have given the Jewish people this
great attribute to compete successfully and this
remarkable fortitude."
The papers show how seriously the justices take
their responsibilities, as illustrated by Blackmun's
lengthy memo to his colleagues as they considered
the Bakke case.
"The Chief [Warren E. Burger], not
inappropriately, has been pressing me for a vote in
this case," Blackmun wrote as he began a 13-page
exposition on his tentative views.
He concluded, "I appreciate the patience of each
and all of you. For me, this case is of such
importance that I refused to be drawn to a precipitate
conclusion. I wanted the time to think about it and to
study the pertinent material. Because weeks are still
available before the end of the term, I do not
apologize; I merely explain."
This story was reported and written by staff writers
Weiser, Biskupic, Bob Woodward and Fred Barbash.
Researcher David Greenberg contributed to the
report.
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LIFE A1D TIMES /BY LINDA GREENHOUSE
ITH ITS SOARING COL-
umns and grand public spaces.
the Supreme Court building
seems designed to inspire awe.
That is especially true of the
courtroom itself, a high-ceil-
inged sanctum of hushed for-
mality where the Justices
emerge precisely at 10 o'clock from behind
a velvet curtain to face rows of lawyers and
tourists standing respectfully at attentiort-
Reporters stand too, and few would deny
having felt a touch of awe on the occasion of
a major decision. The sheer power invested
in those nine individuals would guarantee
that, even if they convened in a shack.
But after years of trudging up from the
press room, pad in hand, to see the Justices
in action, what I often sense is not so much
the Court's majesty as its intimacy. The
Court's power is vast, but its scale is small.
MORE THAN ALMOST ANY OTHER
public officials, the people who embody the
Supreme Court put themselves on display
day after day. A Senator may visit the
Senate floor to cast a vote or read a speech,
but the chamber is often nearly deserted
even when the Senate is in session.
In the Court, by contrast, every public
session is a working session, requiring the
Justices to perform without a safety net.
Power and vulnerability exist side by
side. No aides hand the Justices follow-up
questions to ask the lawyers; no chairman
gavels a recess when things get sticky.
The atmosphere is businesslike. The Jus-
tices make nothing so clear as that every
second counts. Showmanship is disfa-
vored; when an inexperienced lawyer
makes a florid presentation, a chill almost
visibly settles on the bench.
An argument session can be an occasion
for enlightenment when the lawyers are
skilled. But sometimes they are not; or the Justices
are distracted, domineering, or rude, or the argu-
ment just gets off on the wrong foot.
In January, the Bush Administration's Solicitor
General, Kenneth W. Starr, was making his final
argument to the Court when he inadvertently
pushed the wrong rhetorical button. Early into his
argument in a pornography cast hesata meaw
share with you a bit of the record in the case."
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist interrupted
him in a voice dripping with contempt "Why don't
you just tell us about the record rather than share
it," he said.
If Mr. Starr, a former judge himself and a highly
experienced courtroom advocate, wondered what
he had done to provoke that reaction, he didn't
betray it. "The record tells us, Mr. Chief Justice...."
THE JUSTICES ARE NOT ONLY ON VIEW,
they are accountable. They explain themselves.
Congress and the White House can put off decisions
Linda Greenhouse covers the Supreme Court for
The New York Times.
upremely SheIter(
indefinitely-, entire agendas sink without a trace. But
the Court publicly disposes of everything on its
docket, every petition, every motion. Every case
argued in a term gets some resolution that term.
Issuing decisions is a bureaucratic function in
most courts, handled by a faceless clerk's office.
But at the Supreme Court, the author of a major-
ity opinion announces it personally.
The announcements are rarely high drama, but
they are riveting in their modest way. For exam-
ple, Chief Justice Rehnquist's announcements of
decisions in criminal cases almost invariably re-
count the crime in all its excruciating detail. On he
goes in a conversational tone: the date, scene,
weapon, everyone's names, fact after damning
fact. His presentation makes it clear that what
matters most to the Chief Justice is that a crime
has been committed. Someone should have to pay.
Back when liberal Justices occasionally won
criminal cases and got to make these announce-
ments, their emphasis was the opposite. An an-
nouncement by Justice William J. Brennan Jr.
would leave listeners virtually in the dark about who
did what to whom. But no one would come away
uninformed about why some part of the Bil
of Rights made the conviction invalic
The one member of the Court who de
clines a role in this mini-drama is the crus
senior Justice, Byron R. White, who an
nounces his opinions without explaining a
thing. He just announces the name of thi
case, the docket number, and whether thi
lower court has been affirmed or reversed
When I once asked him why he didn't g
along with the others, he grumbled that ho
considered the little courtroom ceremoni
to be a waste of time. That's too bad.
BUT VISIBLE AS THE JUSTICES ARE ID
their own home, they remain remarkabl3
free of the baggage of public personalit3
that weighs so heavily on other public offi
cials. Part of the reason, no doubt, is the
absence of television from the courtroom, z
stunning anachronism for a major govern
ment institution in an era when governmeni
is often a projection of personality.
Most of the current Justices joined the
Court before televised confirmation hear.
ings brought Clarence Thomas and, more
briefly, David Souter into the living room. A
few months ago, I saw Justice White giving
directions to the cafeteria to some visitors
who clearly had no idea who he was. I once
saw some tourists hand a camera to Justice
Lewis F. Powell, who took the family's
portrait and went on his quiet way.
The Justices won't trade this quaint ano-
nymity lightly. They have rebuffed repeat-
ed requests for televising of their sessions.
Thurgood Marshall once favored television
at the Court, but turned against it after
seeing what he saw as the painful spectacled of Robert H. Bork's confirmation hearings.id '. SO THE PUBLIC WON'T GET TO KNOW
the Justices. More precisely, it won't have
the illusion that it knows the Justices. The
public doesn't know the President either, but in this
era of hyperdemocracy and instant polls, it knows a
public persona called the President and arrives at
some appraisal of how the persona fits the politics.
For judges, personality matters less. Except for
Sandra Day O'Connor, who served in the Arizona
Senate, 2md possibly Anthony M. Kennedy, who
grew up on California politics, it's hard to imagine
any of the current Justices running for office.
David Souter served as New Hampshire's Attor-
ney General, in an appointed post, but this shy and
formal man would almost certainly have recoiled
from having to sell himself to the voters. And while
Antonin Scalia, a genial and witty raconteur, would
be at ease in many political settings, his potential as
a candidate might be limited by his inability to
suffer fools with even a pretense of grace.
The Court shelters its inhabitants from the relent-
less public exposure that is the modern trade-off for
the exercise of great public power. Never quite on
center stage, always a bit out of focus, the Justices
are not about to give up the intimate and anachro-
nistic little world where fate and politics have
placed them for life. U
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AHEAD: SPARSE BUT NOT DULL
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Dull and sparse were words often used to describe
the Supreme Court's 1992-93 docket, which disposed
of a mere 120 cases. But then the usual June crunch
produced some fireworks at the Court, with rulings
on voting rights, religious freedoms, pornography,
and punitive damages, among other areas, that
suddenly made the word dull seem inapplicable.
For the term that begins on Oct. 4, the docket still
looks sparse, but not dull. The Court headed off for
its summer recess in June with fewer cases set for its
fall docket than in any recent year. The Court has
thus far granted only 46 cases for the fall term,
compared with 66 when it recessed last year, and 70
the year before that. But already, the docket looks
meaty, with a number of cases that will continue
controversies stirred up last term.
Most notable are the quartet of Voting Rights Act
cases that will ideal with many of the issues raised
during the controversy over Lani Guinier's Justice
Department nomination, as well as by last term's
decision in Shaw v. Reno, 61 U.S.L.W. 4818
(1993), in which the justices called into question
some aspects of race-based redistricting.
The cases are:
* Holder v. Hall, No. 91-2012, was brought by
the Bleckley County, Ga., county commissioner, who
is defending his position against claims by blacks that
the sole-commissioner system dilutes minority voting
power in violation of @ 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
If Jackie Holder loses, some fear that all sorts of
single elected member rules - from governor on
down - could be subject to scrutiny.
* De Grandy v. Johnson, No. 92-593; Johnson
v. De Grandy, No. 92-519; and United States v.
Florida, No. 92-767 pose a complex set of
voting-rights questions that may clarify how states
should accommodate competing minorities -- in this
case, blacks and Hispanics -- without harming either
one.
Another major case for the fall term seems to pick
up where the Court left off last year. In June, in
Alexander v. United States, 61 U.S.L.W. 479
(1993), the Court said forfeiture provisions of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations law
could be used to seize the entire assets of the owner
of an adult bookstore. In NOW v. Scheidler, No.
92-780, the Court deals with RICO in another First
Amendment-related arena: whether RICO can be used
against blockaders of abortion clinics. The specific
question before the Court has also attracted some
business interest - whether proof of "economic
motive" is necessary to make out a RICO violation.
In another First Amendment-related area, the Court
for the third year running has taken a case that gives
civil-liberties groups heartburn as they weigh their
First Amendment allegiances against other societal
values. In RAV v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992),
and Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993),
the tension was between free speech and society's
desire to eradicate hate crimes. This term, the
conflict is between free speech and sexual
harassment. In Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc.,
No.. 92-1168, the Court is asked to decide whether a
Title VII sexual harassment plaintiff must show that
the harassment had psychological effects.
There is a serious circuit conflict on the issue, with
the 3rd, 8th, and 9th circuits ruling that no such
showing is needed, while the 6th, 7th, and 11th
circuits saying that psychological injury is required.
Since much of the harassment in the case was
speech, the First Amendment is inevitably involved.
The American Civil Liberties Union has joined the
plaintiff, declaring, "The First Amendment does not
bar the government from regulating behavior that
significantly impairs equal employment opportunities
of women and other minorities."
Extending Batson?
Another major gender case set for the fall is
J.E.B. v. T.B., No. 92-1239, which may
significantly extend the rule of Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986). Batson forbids racially
motivated peremptory jury strikes, and the upcoming
case asks whether the same prohibition should extend
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to challenges based on gender. In the Alabama case
before the Court, the male defendant in a paternity
action challenged the state's use of peremptory
challenges to exclude males from his jury.
Three other cases before the Court are of
substantial interest to the legal community: Weiss v.
United States, No. 92-1482, a fundamental challenge
to the way in which military court-martial judges are
selected; Izumi Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips
Corp., No. 92-1123, a test of the practice of wiping
out federal court rulings through the procedure
known as vacatur; and Liteky v. United States, No.
92-6921, which will examine the grounds on which
a federal judge should recuse himself from a case.
Parody on the Docket
A case that has brought much media attention,
including the amicus curiae interest of the likes of
Michael Jackson, Mark Russell, Dolly Parton, and
the Harvard Lampoon, is also scheduled to be heard
this fall. The case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music Inc. No. 92-1292, is a high-stakes battle over
the right of entertainers to parody original works
without first gaining approval from or paying fees to
the copyright holder.
The rap group 2 Live Crew triggered the dispute
with a raunchy parody of the Roy Orbison song "Oh,
Pretty Woman," which it recorded without the
permission of the song's owner, Acuff-Rose Music
Inc.
Parodists and satirists insist that their adaptations
of original works must be counted as "fair use" for
which the owners need not be compensated or
consulted ahead of time. "The world of political
discourse and musical fun may be impoverished" if
permission had to be granted and fees paid, says a
brief from the Capitol Steps and Mark Russell.
Singer Michael Jackson, who owns a large portion
of the Beatles song catalog, is on the other side of the
issue, joining a brief that declared that Jackson,
Parton, and many others "would stand to lose
millions of dollars of revenues" if parody is counted
as fair use.
Even the Harvard Lampoon has weighed in,
asserting that "parody is the life-blood of the
Lampoon." Prudently, the brief notes that "For the
record, the Lampoon has never parodied an opinion
of the court."
Warner Bros. has also filed a brief that does not
take sides, reflecting the company's interests in both
the creative and parodying segments of the
entertainment industry. (Warner Bros. is a division
of Time Warner Inc., an affiliate of American
Lawyer Media, L.P., which publishes Legal Times.)
Other cases pending for the fall that so far have
received less attention include:
* Public funds, private school. In Florence
County School District Four v. Shannon Carter,
No. 91-1523, the Court is asked to decide an
important issue under the Americans with Disabilities
Act: whether a public school district can be ordered
to pay a student's tuition for private school when it is
shown that the public school is unable to provide a
student with the "free appropriate public education"
required by the act.
Shannon Carter, found to have a "serious learning
disability," enrolled in Trident Academy in Mt.
Pleasant, S.C., after her parents were dissatisfied
with the educational program devised for her by the
local public school district. The District Court and
the 4th Circuit found that the local district violated
the act and ordered payment of the tuition, setting the
stage for the high court appeal. The Carters are
joined by the Clinton administration in defending the
lower-court rulings.
* Why was she fired? A Title VII case brought by
a former security officer for Michigan Technological
University will be heard by the Court.
Patricia Milligan-Jensen was hired by the
university in November 1987 and fired three months
later, soon after she filed a sex-discrimination claim
with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. While preparing for trial, the
university discovered that Milligan-Jensen had failed
to reveal a previous DWI conviction on her job
application and claimed that this justified her
dismissal. A District Court found the dismissal
unlawful, but the 6th Circuit reversed, holding that
the "after-acquired evidence" entitled the university
to judgment in its favor, regardless of the alleged sex
discrimination. Her appeal is titled Patricia
Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological
University. No. 92-1214.
* Pending claims. In two cases closely watched by
the civil-rights and business communities, the Court
will examine whether the Civil Rights Act of 1991
applies to claims pending on Nov. 21, 1991, the date
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the law took effect.
The case of Barbara Landgraf v. USI Film
Products. No. 92-757, involves a sexual-harassment
claim against the Tyler, Texas, firm. The other case,
Maurice Rivers, et al. v. Roadway Express, No.
92-938, was brought by two black workers who
claimed that they were fired for racial reasons.
The petitioners in both cases lost in earlier stages
of their suits for reasons that were substantially
affected by provisions of the new civil-rights law.
Appeals courts in the 5th and 6th circuits ruled that
the plaintiffs could not benefit from the new law.
Joined by the Justice Department, the plaintiffs are
asking the high court for a ruling that the new law
applies to pending cases.
* Defining child pornography. Federal law makes
it a crime to distribute or receive any visual
depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit
conduct, defined as including "lascivious exhibition of
the genitals or pubic area of any person."
The question for the Court in Knox v. United
States, No. 92-1183, is whether it is possible to
violate that law when those body parts are actually
covered by clothing. Stephen Knox of State College,
Pa., is challenging his conviction under the law,
noting that the offending videotapes he got in the mail
showed girls wearing underwear and bathing suits.
The United States asserts that nudity is not necessary
to constitute "lascivious exhibition."
* Counting heads. A coalition of airlines is before
the Court in Northwest Airlines v. County of Kent.
Mich., No. 92-97, seeking to strengthen the so-called
Anti-Head Tax Act. The federal law bars state and
local governments from imposing "head taxes" on air
passengers, but it does not bar state and locally
operated airports from collecting "reasonable" landing
fees or rental charges. The Michigan airport has
rung up a sizable surplus by charging the airlines
landing and parking fees, terminal rental fees, and
100 percent of the cost of "crash, fire, and rescue"
service, as well as an array of other concession and
gross-receipt fees.
* Working on the railroad. A case of considerable
interest to the railroad industry is before the Court in
Department of Revenue of Oregon v. ACF
Industries Inc., No. 92-74.
The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform
Act of 1976 prohibits "discriminatory state taxation of
railroad property" as a way of enhancing the financial
security of the rail industry. ACF Industries, which
leases railroad cars to shippers and railroads, cited
the act in challenging the taxation scheme of Oregon.
Oregon's real-estate and personal-property tax offers
a variety of exemptions - for livestock, bees, and
poultry, among others - but none for railroad cars.
The question before the Court is whether Oregon, by
exempting some things but not railroads from its
taxes, violates the federal rail law. A District Court
found no violation, but the 9th Circuit reversed,
holding that Oregon impermissibly discriminates
against rail carriers.
* Private eyes. In U.S. Department of Defense v.
Federal Labor Relations Authority. No. 92-1223,
the Court will resolve an issue that has been
presented in more than 60 separate cases before the
FLRA: whether the federal Privacy Act protects from
disclosure the home addresses of federal employees.
The dispute arises typically when a union seeks the
home addresses of federal employees it wants to
represent. Federal employers are generally required
by law to provide information to unions relevant to
collective bargaining, but agencies have cited the
Privacy Act in declining to release information on
home addresses. When it first looked at the issue in
1985, the FLRA held that release of the addresses
was prohibited. A year later, it shifted position,
citing the Freedom of Information Act. The issue
has been dealt with in all the appeals courts, a
majority of which have rejected the FLRA's position.
Tony Mauro covers the Supreme Court and legal
issues for USA Today and the Gannett News Service.
"Courtside," his column on the Court, appears every
other week in Legal Times.
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